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ABSTRACT 
 
A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF THE FACTORS THAT CONTRIBUTE TO THE 
SUCCESS OF NON-VIOLENT REVOLUTIONS 
 
 
 
By 
Nicholas P. Vucic 
December 2010 
 
Thesis supervised by Dr. Daniel Lieberfeld. 
 What enables some non-violent revolutions to succeed while others do not?  
Examining Poland’s nonviolent revolution of 1989 and Serbia’s Bulldozer Revolution in 
2000 as case studies, this thesis analyzes the impact of certain factors on the success of 
non-violent protests.  This thesis argues that states are more likely to achieve revolution 
through peaceful measures if these factors are present prior to revolution.  In this 
research, I examine the impact of these factors in Poland in 1989 and in Serbia in 2000.  
Additionally, this comparative case study will generate hypotheses about the main factors 
explaining the outcomes that can be investigated in other cases. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
1.1 Research Overview 
 What enables some non-violent revolutions to succeed while others do not?  In 
1989, Poland experienced a successful peaceful political revolution led by the 
independent trade union Solidarity in the face of repression attempts by the government 
of Poland.  Eleven years later, in 2000, the Democratic Opposition of Serbia led peaceful 
protests that culminated in the overthrow of the Slobodan Milosevic regime and a non-
violent transition to democracy.  This thesis is a comparison of the factors that impacted 
the success of non-violent revolutions in Poland and Serbia.  
 This research hopes to expand on the research of political scientist Kurt Schock, 
which analyzes the underlying causes of successful non-violent revolutions, especially 
with regard to discovering why some turn violent and others resolve peacefully either 
through democratic elections, political liberalization, or the removal of an non-
democratic regime.  In order to recognize the causes of success, the move towards a more 
democratic political system, in non-violent revolutions, it is essential to explore the 
existing theoretical explanations of success of non-violent movements and the critiques 
of these theories.  Schock explains that there are three factors that are important to the 
success of non-violent protests: 1) a link between civil society institutions and the 
challengers, 2) the level of decentralization in the structure of networks of oppositional 
organizations, and 3) the levels1 of resilience, the ability to resist repression, and 
leverage, the ability to mobilize support.  According to Schock, each of these conditions 
2 
is equally important to the success of non-violent movements and that the factors 
influence one another.    
 Three terms that Schock utilizes in relation to his case studies are unarmed 
insurrection, non-idealised non-violence, and pragmatic nonviolence.  Schock uses 
political scientist Stephen Zunes’s definition, which defines unarmed insurrections as 
“organized popular challenges to government authority that depend primarily on methods 
of non-violent action rather than on armed methods.”1  Additionally, Schock employs 
political scientist Ralph Summy’s definition of non-idealised non-violence, which states, 
“In its non-idealised form a nonviolent campaign may extend into other political 
categories.  Though remaining predominately nonviolent, it may contain some actions 
that are conducted in the conventional sphere, and perhaps even lapse into the violent 
sphere.”2  Schock then defines pragmatic non-violence as a “commitment to methods of 
nonviolent action due to their perceived effectiveness, a view of means and ends as 
potentially separable, a perception of the conflict as a struggle of incompatible interests, 
an attempt to inflict nonphysical pressure on the opponent during the course of the 
struggle to undermine the opponent’s power, and an absence of nonviolence as a way of 
life.”3  These terms are important because Schock states that each of his case studies 
qualifies as an “‘unarmed insurrection’, and as episodes of ‘non-idealised’ and 
‘pragmatic’ nonviolent action.”4  Additionally, the two case studies for this research, 
Poland and Serbia, also qualify as unarmed insurrections and episodes of non-idealised 
and pragmatic nonviolence, which means that these two case studies can utilize a 
                                                
1 Schock, Kurt. Unarmed Insurrections: People Power Movements In Nondemocracies. Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press, 2004. p. xvi. 
2 Ibid., xvii. 
3 Ibid., xvii. 
4 Ibid., xxvi  
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methodology similar to Schock’s, since these cases are comparable to his six case studies 
in these aspects.   
 This thesis analyzes the impact on protest outcomes of variables including a link 
between transnational civil society institutions and the challengers, opposition network 
decentralization, and degree of leverage and resilience.  In order to clarify what is meant 
by each of the three factors, it is important to define the key terms present in each of the 
factors, which for this research are “civil society,” “non-governmental organizations,” 
“challengers,” “leverage,” and “resilience.”  In order to enhance comprehension of the 
concepts and factors that will be presented in this thesis, it is important to define the key 
terms.  In a report titled Open Government Fostering Dialogue with Civil Society written 
by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), civil society 
is defined as 
non-profit and non-governmental organisations, organised by groups of 
people in the sphere of civil society, working for a cause for the benefit of 
society, that very often contribute as well to the development of 
democracy.  There are, however, grey areas in this definition, 
organisational forms, such as political parties and liberation movements 
that, on the one hand, spring from civil society and, on the other, may end 
by assuming government responsibility.5 
 
Schock defines challengers as “ordinary citizens engaged in methods of nonviolent 
action,” which are independent from the state and come “from any and all classes and 
castes” that are not required to hold any particular “ideological, religious, or metaphysical 
beliefs.” Political scientist Leslie R Alm states “a non-governmental organization is 
defined as a ‘scientific, professional, business, non-profit, or public interest organization 
or association, which is neither affiliated with, nor under the direction of a 
                                                
5 Open Government: Fostering Dialogue with Civil Society. Paris: Oecd, 2003. p. 191.  
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government.’”6 Additionally, Schock identifies leverage as the “ability of contentious 
actors to mobilize the withdrawal of support from opponents or invoke pressure against 
them through the networks upon which opponents depend for their power.”7  
Furthermore, Schock defines resilience as “the capacity of contentious actors to continue 
to mobilize collective action despite the actions of opponents aimed at constraining or 
inhibiting their activities.”8   
 In addition to “civil society,” “political repression” and two relevant terms, 
“political liberalization” and “reform,” are key concepts for this research, because they 
are practical terms in the measurement of success for each non-violent movement.  
Political scientist Bret Lee Billet defines political repression as 
actions taken by political authorities to neutralize, suppress, or eliminate a 
perceived threat to the security and stability of the government, the 
regime, or the state itself.  They include acts of censorship against the 
mass media and political publications, and the like, as well as restrictions 
on the political activity and participation of the general public, or specific 
persons, parties, and organizations.9 
 
 This research will use the definition of “political liberalization” developed by 
political scientists Guillermo A. O'Donnell, Philippe C. Schmitter, and Laurence 
Whitehead.  O’Donnell, Schmitter, and Whitehead define political liberalization as 
“making effective rights that protect individuals and groups from arbitrary, repressive, or 
                                                
6 Alm, Leslie R. "Is Spotlighting Enough? Environmental NGOs and the Commision for Environmental 
Cooperation. " Canadian - American Public Policy  67 (2006): 1-46. ProQuest Military 
Collection, ProQuest. Web.  9 Apr. 2010. 
7 Schock, Kurt. Unarmed Insurrections: People Power Movements In Nondemocracies. Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press, 2004. Pp. 142 -143. 
8 Ibid., 142. 
9 Billet, Bret Lee. Investment Behavior of Multinational Corporations in Developing Areas: Comparing the 
Development Assistance Committee, Japanese, and American Corporations. New Brunswick: Transaction 
Publishers, 1991. p. 31 
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illegal acts committed by a communist or authoritarian state.”10   According to political 
scientist Michael Bratton, “the release of political prisoners, the lifting of government 
censorship, and the legalization of banned political parties,” are some recognizable 
examples of what constitutes political liberalization.11   Additionally, political scientist 
John Keeler defines “reform” as “a policy innovation manifesting an unusually 
substantial redirection or reinforcement of previous public policy.”12  Finally, it is 
important for this research to define what is meant by the dependent variable of 
“success.” For the purpose of this research, success is defined as achieving the deposal of 
a non-democratic regime and the beginning of a move towards a more democratic 
political system. 
 Schock analyzes six cases of non-violent movements in order to discover what 
factors enable non-violent movements to become successful.  Schock examines the 
success of the non-violent movements in South Africa and the Philippines of the mid-
1980s, the failure of non-violent movements in Burma and China in the late 1980s, and 
the success of the non-violent movements in Nepal and Thailand of the early 1990s.  
Schock examines the structure of the opposition movement, the ability of the opposition 
movement to connect with civil society organizations, and the level of resilience and 
leverage of each movement.  From this analysis, Schock concludes that a decentralized 
opposition network aided the non-violent movement in persisting through repression 
attempts by the government.  Additionally, Schock resolved that a link between civil 
                                                
10 O'Donnell, Guillermo, Philippe C. Schmitter, and Laurence Whitehead. Transitions from Authoritarian 
Rule: Comparative Perspectives. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986.  
11 Bratton, Michael, and Nicholas Van De Walle. Democratic Experiments in Africa: Regime Transitions in 
Comparative Perspective (Cambridge Studies in Comparative Politics). New York: Cambridge University 
Press, 1997.  
12  Keeler, John. "Opening the Window for Reform: Mandates,." Comparative Political Studies 25.4 
(1993): 433-486. Comparative Political Studies. Web. 7 Dec. 2009. 
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society and the opposition movement also strengthened the ability of non-violent 
movements to succeed, because the heightened amounts of participation, resources, and 
media attention were able to enhance support for the movement.  Furthermore, Schock 
concluded that opposition movements that had higher levels of resilience and leverage 
proved more successful than those with weaker levels of resilience and leverage.  An 
important aspect of Schock’s research on these three factors is that there are various 
points where these factors overlap and interact with one another.  An example of this is 
that a decentralized leadership structure in the opposition movement contributes to the 
resilience of a non-violent movement.  This research will utilize these concepts to explain 
how these factors impact the success of non-violent movements in the cases of Poland 
and Serbia.     
1.2 Thesis Structure 
 This thesis is divided into six chapters.  The first chapter supplies an introduction 
into the research question, the research hypotheses, the methodology that will test these 
hypotheses, and this thesis’s contribution to research.  Chapter two provides a review of 
the literature on non-violent action and the scholarly debate on the value of non-violent 
action in the contemporary international political climate.  Chapter three analyzes the 
impact of civil society in Poland and Serbia and their ability to connect with the 
challengers of the state.  Chapter four provides an examination into the structure of the 
opposition networks present in Poland and Serbia and their consequential ability to resist 
governmental repression attempts.  Chapter five explores the levels of resilience and 
leverage of the opposition movements in Poland and Serbia.  Chapter six presents the 
conclusions of this study focusing on the impact of Schock’s three factors discussed in 
7 
Chapters 3 - 5 on the success of non-violent action in Serbia and Poland, along with 
providing additional recommendations and hypotheses for future research.   
1.3 Thesis Hypotheses and Purpose of Research 
 In order to discover whether or not the presence of a link between civil society 
and the challengers, a decentralized opposition network, leverage, and resilience creates 
the conditions necessary for peaceful revolutions to succeed, there are three principal 
research hypotheses that need to be explored.  The primary research hypothesis (H1) is 
that in comparing countries, those that have the presence of a link between civil-society 
institutions and oppressed citizens enable the conditions necessary for the success of non-
violent action.  The second hypothesis (H2) is that in comparing countries, those that 
organize a decentralized network of oppositional institutions are more likely to achieve 
peaceful political transition.  The third hypothesis (H3) is that in comparing countries, 
movements that have greater resilience and leverage are more likely to accomplish 
success through non-violent action. 
 The goal of this research is to continue the development of a framework of the 
factors that enable the success of non-violent action in non-democracies that could 
provide additional hypotheses for testing.  This research also hopes to contribute to the 
literature on the subject of how non-violent action can succeed in challenging non-
democracies.  Following Schock’s study, this research examines cases that fall within the 
third wave of democratization, which could help assess the extent that the factors that 
enable the success of non-violent action for these modern cases fit within the general 
spectrum of cases from all three waves.  The research of contemporary cases, such as 
Poland and Serbia, investigates how factors that impact their success compare and 
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contrast with factors that had impacted the success of non-violent movements 
historically.   
1.4 Research Methodology 
 Aspects of the methodology for this research project that require further 
clarification are case study selection, research design, strategy to accumulate data that is 
relevant to this research, operationalization and classification of variables and terms, the 
establishment of reliability and validity, and the uses of the findings in future instances.  
As mentioned in the introduction the two cases that are used in this research project are 
Serbia and Poland, which will act as cases that will help explain how a country can 
experience a peaceful revolution.  The two cases, Serbia and Poland, were selected due to 
their political, social, demographic differences, and successful non-violent revolutionary 
outcomes.  These two cases were selected primarily due to different pre-revolution 
characteristics that existed in those societies, but experienced a similar set of 
consequences, which follows Mill’s method of differences.  This research will test these 
two cases to discover what characteristics the movements shared and to what extent they 
contributed to the success of the movement.  Furthermore, this research will attempt to 
determine whether or not Schock’s explanation of the factors that enable success in non-
violent action apply to Poland and Serbia.  What this means is that this thesis will test 
Schock’s three factors in two cases that were not explored in Unarmed Insurrections and 
attempt to determine if Schock was correct or if there are parts of his theory that do not 
apply to these cases.  This study is limited by resource and time considerations, therefore 
further research in the cases and factors is necessary.  Additionally, this research analyzes 
9 
two cases through a cross-national comparison that may provide insight that could go 
unnoticed in a larger-n quantitative study.   
 This research analyzes the cases of Serbia and Poland during their non-violent 
revolutionary movements in the context of Schock’s three factors that enable success for 
non-violent movements.  In order to discover the impact of these three factors on the two 
case studies, this research will examine major non-violent action campaigns and events in 
each case during the revolutionary period.  This thesis will describe the event, the date, 
the location, the method of non-violence, the participation numbers, participation of third 
parties, and the leaders/organizers of the event.  This research will find this data through 
examinations of primary and secondary sources consisting of periodicals, academic 
journals, government records, non-governmental organization records, books, and 
archived event flyers.   
 In order to discover the impact of a link between civil society organizations and 
the challengers, this study will explore the sources to determine major campaigns and 
events in Poland and Serbia.  Once the major campaigns and events are recognized, this 
study will attempt to obtain the level of non-governmental organizations involved in the 
non-violent protests and which groups and/or individuals organized and led the events.  
By finding the level of involvement of civil society institutions in the non-violent events, 
this thesis can determine whether or not civil society organizations were active in the 
movement and to what extent.  If it appears that barely any third party institutions 
participated in the campaigns and events, then it could be determined that a link between 
civil society institutions and the challengers did not exist.  Conversely, if the research 
reveals that multiple civil society organizations were active in a variety of protests, then it 
10 
means that these third party institutions were closely connected with the movement.  
Additionally, by discovering the leaders and organizers of an event or campaign, a more 
in-depth analysis of the role and impact of third party institutions could be revealed.  This 
is possible, since the civil society institutions could either be at the forefront of the 
movement, or simply in the background as non-active participants.  If it is determined 
that civil society organizations led and/or organized a large portion of the events, then a 
link between civil society and the challengers becomes more apparent.   
 The second factor, the level of decentralization in the leadership structure of the 
opposition network, is determined through an analysis of the events to discover what 
groups and or individuals organized and led the events.  If it appears that a diverse 
amount of groups and individuals were at the head of the movement, then it is possible to 
derive that the movement had a decentralized leadership structure.  If a variety of groups 
and/or individuals led the events and campaigns that would signify that the leadership of 
the movement is not coming from an individual leader in a hierarchical structure.  In 
addition to analyzing the leadership of major events and campaign, this study will also 
examine primary and secondary sources that discuss the structure of the movement.  
Several scholars have already explored the leadership structures in the non-violent 
movements in Poland and Serbia, so this research will also use these sources to help 
determine whether the movement’s leadership structure was decentralized.   
 The third factor, the leverage and resilience abilities of the non-violent opposition 
movement, is measurable through an examination of three characteristics of the major 
campaigns and events of the movements.  The three characteristics that this thesis will 
explore to determine the leverage and resiliency of a movement are the location where 
11 
the event is held, the non-violent method utilized at the event, and the numbers of 
participants in the event.  The location of the event is important, because it can show the 
ability of the movement to mobilize support throughout the country, which signifies that 
the more locations that events are held, the greater the leverage ability is in a movement.  
Additionally, the method of non-violent action can help determine the leverage and 
resilience capacity of a movement, because it displays the ability of a movement to 
innovate and develop strategies that make it more difficult for the regime to repress.  If a 
movement implements a diverse variety of methods, the leverage ability increases, since 
more people are able to participate due to the likelihood that non-violent techniques are 
more easily employed by a greater variety of people.  Furthermore, the implementation of 
a variety of non-violent methods increases the resilience capability of the opposition 
movement since the regime would be unable to target a specific technique or action to 
prohibit.  The participation numbers of an event help to determine the leverage ability of 
a movement since the more people at an event signifies that the movement has the ability 
to mobilize high numbers of participants.  Additionally, the greater amount of 
participants at an event means that the regime is less capable of repressing the movement; 
since the regime would not have the resources to successful repress that number of 
people.  In other words, it is easier for the regime to repress a few hundred protesters as 
compared to a few thousand protestors. 
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Chapter 2: Literature Review 
2.1 Chapter Overview 
 What factors enable success in cases of non-violent action?   Scholars present a 
variety of theories on factors that enable success in non-violent revolutions.  This chapter 
explores the three factors that enable success in non-violent movements as described by 
political scientist Kurt Schock and what other scholars believe about each factor.   
 The chapter begins with how scholars have defined non-violent action.  The next 
three sections discuss Schock’s theories regarding the role of civil-society institutions, the 
structural composition of the opposition network, and the leverage and resilience abilities 
of the opposition network in the success of non-violent movements.  The chapter 
concludes with an assessment of the areas of the literature that are limited in their 
description of the factors that enable success for non-violent action and how the literature 
reviewed relates to this thesis.   
2.2 Non-violent Action 
 With an increase in non-violent movements internationally, the debates between 
various schools of thought has also increased, creating a variety of a discussion on 
multiple aspects and characteristics of non-violent action.  A comprehensive definition of 
non-violent action is provided by Schock in Unarmed Insurrections, which draws on 
political scientists Ronald M. McCarthy, Douglas G. Bond, and Gene Sharp.  Schock 
compiles a variety of existing definitions to define non-violent action as action that  
involves activity in the collective pursuit of social or political objectives.  
More specifically, nonviolent action involves an active process of bringing 
political, economic, social, emotional, or moral pressure to bear in the 
wielding of power in contentious interactions between collective actors 
(McCarthy 1990, 1997; Sharp 1973, 1990, 1999). Nonviolent 
13 
action…operates outside the bounds of institutionalized political channels 
(Bond 1994). Nonviolent action occurs through (1) acts of omission, 
whereby people refuse to perform acts expected by norms, custom, law, or 
decree; (2) acts of commission, whereby people perform acts that they do 
not usually perform, are not expected by norms or customs to perform, or 
are forbidden by law, regulation or decree to perform; or (3) a 
combination of acts of omission and commission (Sharp 1973). Rather 
than being viewed as half of a rigid violent-nonviolent dichotomy, 
nonviolent action may be better understood as a set of methods with 
special features that are different from those of both violent resistance and 
institutional politics (McCarthy 1990).13 
 
In addition to the inclusive definition provided by Schock, this thesis will use a more 
concise definition of non-violent action.  For the purpose of this study, non-violent action 
is defined as the use of methods that do not utilize violence in order to place pressure on 
the target to achieve political, social, or economic goals.  Additionally, this study breaks 
non-violent action down into the three categories of non-violent methods described by 
Sharp: protest and persuasion, methods of noncooperation, and methods of non-violent 
intervention.  This thesis utilizes Schock’s summary of Sharp’s three categories of non-
violent methods to categorize the different types of non-violent action, which states 
Methods of protest and persuasion are used to reveal a problem, illustrate 
the extent of dissatisfaction, rouse public support or the support of third 
parties, overcome fear and acquiescence, and expose the state’s 
illegitimacy.  They include methods such as protest demonstrations, 
marches, rallies, public speeches, declarations, the collective display of 
symbols, and vigils.  Methods of noncooperation are used to disrupt the 
status quo and undermine the state’s power, resources, and legitimacy.  
They include methods such as boycotts, strikes, open refusal to pay taxes 
or enter the military, and other forms of civil disobedience.  Methods of 
nonviolent intervention are used to disrupt attempts at continued 
subjugation.  They include methods such as sit-ins, nonviolent sabotage, 
pickets, blockades, hunger strikes, land occupations, and the development 
of parallel or alternative institutions.14   
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Sharp’s three categories of non-violent methods are useful for this thesis to help 
differentiate between the types of non-violent action used and the intent behind using 
different non-violent methods.  For example, the American civil rights movement 
employed a variety of non-violent methods, such as sit-ins, marches, and boycotts, which 
were intended to disrupt continued oppression, expose the state’s illegitimacy, and 
disrupt the status quo, respectively.    
2.3 The Politics of Nonviolent Action 
 In 1973, Sharp wrote The Politics of Nonviolent Action, which attempted to 
explain how non-institutional actions and non-violent methods could drive political 
transition.  This groundbreaking work analyzed examples of non-violent political 
transition, developed the concept of pragmatic non-violence, as spiritual non-violence 
was the prominent concept at the time, and explained the means that cause non-violent 
movements to generate political transition.  Sharp’s non-violent-action theory asserts  
when people refuse their cooperation, withhold their help, and persist in 
their disobedience and defiance, they are denying their opponent the basic 
human assistance and cooperation which any government or hierarchal 
system requires.  If they do this in sufficient numbers for long enough, that 
government or hierarchical system will no longer have power.15  
 
 Sharp’s analysis centers on the balance of power between the government and the 
people, since the government’s power originates from the obedience and cooperation of 
the people.  Once the people become disobedient and stop cooperating with the 
government’s desires, then it can no longer effectively govern those people. Sharp 
contends 
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if the subjects deny the ruler’s right to rule and to command, they are 
withdrawing the general agreement or group consent, which makes 
possible the existing government. This loss of authority sets in motion the 
disintegration of the ruler’s power.  That power is reduced to the degree 
that he is denied authority.  Where the loss is extreme, the existence of that 
particular government is threatened. 16 
 
Sharp adds that non-violent action shifts the balance of power in favor of the people 
making the government unable to rule, “regardless of its coerciveness or brutality,”17 
because further repression only exacerbates the situation, as opposed to philosopher 
Niccolò Machiavelli, who believed cruelty could marginalize any opposition through 
submission.18  
 With an advantage in the power relations, political transition is produced through 
one of four mechanisms of change, which Sharp identifies as conversion, 
accommodation, nonviolent coercion, and disintegration.  Conversion occurs when “the 
government…adopts the challenger’s point of view and concedes to its goals.”19  
Accommodation happens when “the government grants concessions to the challengers 
even though it is not converted to the challengers’ point of view, is not forced to concede 
by the challengers’ actions, and has the capacity to continue the struggle.”20  Sharp states 
that nonviolent coercion, which is change that is “achieved against the government’s will 
as a result of the challengers’ successful undermining of the government’s power, 
legitimacy, and ability to control the situation through methods of nonviolent action” is 
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typically the most successful mechanism of change in non-democracies.21   Sharp defines 
disintegration as “when the government breaks down in the face of widespread 
nonviolent action.”22  These mechanisms of change are important for this research since 
they help explain the ways non-violent action could produce political transitions, which 
introduce a framework that helps explain why some non-violent movements succeed.  
Sharp’s four mechanisms of change explain how political change occurs when non-
violent action is used, which helps identify the process that Schock’s three factors enable 
success in non-violent action. 
 Some scholars present theories that contend that the non-violent action theory is 
limited in its explanation of the structural aspect of political transition, especially 
regarding the impact of political opportunities.  For example, sociologist David S. Meyer 
argues that “ongoing interactions between challengers and the world around them 
determine not only the immediate outcomes of a social movement, but also its 
development and potential influence over time.”23  In other words, changes in the 
political landscape, such as elections and economic crises, can open or close political 
opportunities for the opposition networks.  The significance of this criticism is that 
although neither theory claims to completely explain all aspects of non-violent action 
individually, it is important to utilize concepts from each to develop a more 
comprehensive theoretical framework. Sharp’s conclusions are limited by minimizing the 
impact of structural considerations, such as the impact of different administrations or 
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upcoming elections.  On the other hand, the non-violent-action approach’s attention to 
methods and mechanisms and movement outcomes provides a solid foundation, as it 
explains the role of certain factors and their influence on political change, which Schock 
expands upon.   
2.4 Civil-Society’s Role in Non-violent Action 
 The principal assertion of Schock’s Unarmed Insurrections is that three factors 
enable success in non-violent movements.  This section discusses Schock’s first factor, 
the role of the link between civil-society organizations, primarily transnational 
institutions, such as Amnesty International and Freedom House, and the challengers of 
the regime, such as the Indian people led by Gandhi.  Schock states “the global processes 
that intensified at the end of the twentieth century created networks linking oppressed and 
intermediary groups, thereby increasing the potential for challengers to invoke the 
support of third parties [civil-society institutions].” Furthermore, Schock asserts “the 
support of challengers by third parties may be crucial in providing them [challengers] 
with greater leverage or in tipping the balance of power in their [challengers] favor” 
which signifies that “nonviolent action by the oppressed [challengers] may have a greater 
likelihood of succeeding where these networks are involved.”24  
 This means that domestic and international civil-society institutions provide 
opposition movements with financial and material resources, media coverage, and 
general support that help strengthen the protest and resistance abilities of the movement, 
making the non-violent action more likely to succeed.  Domestic NGO’s are civil-society 
institutions that develop and operate in the country of the conflict, whereas international 
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NGO’s are civil-society institutions that are headquartered in countries outside of the one 
where the conflict is occurring.  Third parties refer primarily to international or domestic 
organizations independent of government influence and/or support, such as civil-society 
institutions like international rights organizations, labor unions, and political parties.  
Schock concludes that the introduction of civil-society organizations into non-violent 
movements strengthens the capabilities of the opposition network to not only resist 
repression efforts by the regime, but also to more easily organize and protest.25  As a 
result of a stronger opposition network, with increased funding, support, and operational 
capacity due to the inclusion of civil-society institutions, the potential for the success of 
the non-violent action increases.26   
 According to Schock, the informal alliance between civil-society institutions and 
the challengers in a non-violent movement can transform multiple aspects of the 
movement, especially the movement’s potential success.  Schock contends that the 
influence and power of domestic and transnational civil-society institutions is used to 
attract international attention that pressures the regime to resolve the conflict or topples 
the regime.  Since non-governmental organizations already have formal institutions and a 
supply of resources, such as funds, contacts, leaders, and access to the media, it is easier 
for these civil-society institutions to provide the movement with access to these 
resources.  Schock states that the addition of these organizations into the movement 
makes the movement instantly stronger, with improved capacity to resist repression and 
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mobilize support, as the movement gains experience and access to greater resources from 
the non-governmental organizations.27   
 Both domestic and transnational civil-society institutions connected to challengers 
can have a deep impact on the success of that movement.  Transnational civil-society 
organizations usually become interested in non-violent action due to some aspect of the 
movement that relates to their philosophy and/or objectives.  These groups often include 
global human-rights organizations, such as Amnesty International and Human Rights 
Watch, but also typically include other political groups, such as the Open Society 
Institute, economic groups, such as the Aurora Foundation, social groups, like the Red 
Star Belgrade fans, cultural groups, such as POLCUL, environmental organizations, such 
as Greenpeace, and religious rights groups, such as Lutheran World Relief.   The 
inclusion of a variety of civil-society organizations means that the movement can 
implement strategies that they would not have previously considered.  Conversely, 
domestic civil-society institutions develop primarily for social, non-conflictive reasons, 
but governmental repression can create a large number of these groups or increase the 
power and support of the pre-existing groups, because during repression, societal 
consciousness is raised and participation in civil-society institutions increases.28 Although 
the domestic civil-society institutions typically lack movement experience, knowledge, 
and resources, they are able to provide resources to the movement that transnational civil-
society organizations cannot.  
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 Schock explains that the most important benefit of establishing a link between 
civil-society institutions and the challengers in a state is that it provides the movement 
with greater leverage and resiliency abilities, which is discussed in detail in Chapter 5, 
which help to shift the balance of power in the relationship between challengers and the 
regime.29  This shift in the power relationship is especially important in context of the 
obedient and cooperative relationship that the people have with the regime, since once the 
people stop obeying and cooperating with the regime, the regime loses its ability to 
govern.30 
 Prior to testing whether the link between civil-society institutions and the 
challengers enabled success in the cases of the non-violent movements in Poland and 
Serbia, I will summarize Schock’s own findings on his six cases to better understand how 
civil-society institutions could impact a movement.  In South Africa, Schock discovers 
that the United Democratic Front (UDF) and the Congress of South African Trade 
Unions (COSATU) coordinated a variety of other civil-society institutions, like the 
National Education Crisis Committee, which was designed to teach people about the 
current situation, and helped transfer power to the challengers.31  Similarly, two civil-
society institutions in the Philippines, the Bagong Alyansang Makabayan (Bayan) and the 
United Democratic Opposition (UNIDO) organized the other civil-society groups to fight 
against the Marcos regime.  As a result of the link between civil-society institutions and 
the challengers in the Philippines, the non-violent movement was able to effectively 
implement a variety of non-violent methods, such as economic boycotts and 
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transportation strikes, innovate their strategy when necessary, and mobilize even more 
people and resources to the anti-Marcos cause.  
 In the other two successful instances of non-violent action, Thailand and Nepal, 
Schock credits civil-society institutions with overcoming differences and working 
together with the challengers to enhance the capability of movements to efficiently 
pressure the regimes to transition to a more democratic government.32  Conversely, in 
Burma and China, Schock cites the lack of an active domestic civil-society and the 
isolation of both countries in preventing transnational civil-society institutions from 
working with the challengers as part of the reason that both cases ultimately proved 
unsuccessful.33   
 A link existed between international and domestic civil-society institutions in the 
four successful non-violent movements Schock studied, but did not exist in the 
unsuccessful non-violent movements in Burma and China.  In the successful cases, a link 
between civil-society institutions and the challengers helped supply the pro-democracy 
movements with greater resources, additional leadership, and international attention, 
which aided in the movements’ success. 
 The Boomerang Pattern developed by political scientists Margaret E. Keck and 
Kathryn Sikkink supports Schock’s concept that a link between civil-society 
organizations and the challengers enables success in non-violent action.  Keck and 
Sikkink developed a model (Appendix 5) that explains how transnational advocacy 
networks (TANs), which are networks of protesters and transnational non-government 
organizations, work together to surmount repression attempts by the state.  In the 
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Boomerang Pattern, International Non-governmental organizations (INGOs) aid 
challengers in an oppressive state by circumventing the blockage by using their 
international support and resources to pressure other states and the repressive state to 
produce positive political change.34  The Boomerang Pattern is a prime example of how 
third party institutions act to strengthen and support opposition movements, in order to 
produce political change, which could include regime transition.  For example, Keck and 
Sikkink cite the case of the rubber tappers in the Amazon region of Brazil, who 
successfully implored the National Council of Rubber Tappers, the Catholic Church, and 
U.S. environmentalists to use their resources and power to place pressure on the Brazilian 
government to stop encroachment by cattle ranchers.35    
2.5 Decentralized Leadership Structure in Non-violent Movements 
  This section discusses Schock’s second factor that enables success for non-
violent action: the importance of a decentralized leadership structure in the opposition 
network.  In addition to exploring the role of transnational civil-society institutions in 
non-violent movements, Schock asserts that movements are more likely to succeed 
through peaceful means if the opposition network challenging the regime has a 
decentralized structure.   A decentralized opposition network structure means that the 
challenging movement of activists and non-governmental agencies cooperate to form a 
network that leads as a whole, as opposed to a centralized structure in which leadership 
comes from an individual or a single organization.  Schock contends that a decentralized 
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network is more able to resist governmental repression, predominantly as a result of 
preventing the regime from targeting a specific individual or organization for repression.   
 The organizational structure of the opposition network in a non-violent movement 
can affect numerous aspects of the ability of non-violent action to succeed.  In Unarmed 
Insurrections, Schock explains that “decentralized, yet coordinated organizational 
networks” enhance the ability of the movement to resist repression and increase 
operational capacity, which increases the potential for the non-violent action to 
accomplish its objectives.36  Additionally, Schock asserts that  
A decentralized challenge, however, requires a significant degree of 
coordination and aggregation.  Umbrella organizations or federative 
structures are useful in this regard, as they may facilitate the brokering of 
diverse groups, promote the flow of information and the aggregation of 
resources, coordinate local networks and struggles into national political 
challenges, and magnify the resources and power of a challenge.  
Umbrella organizations or federative structures also facilitate the forging 
of broad alliances of diverse groups that are necessary for effective 
campaigns of protest and noncooperation.37   
 
What Schock means is that an umbrella organization or a federation of the political 
opposition allows the movement to act through coordinated measures, which means that 
the distribution of resources, the delegation of duties, and the spread of information are 
made easier.  These tasks are made easier because the umbrella organization or federation 
has standardized methods and processes already in place and the other members of the 
opposition movement follow these standards and process, streamlining the ability of the 
movement to carry out these duties.   
 Schock explains that a decentralized structure in a non-violent movement helps 
the network resist repression for five main reasons.  Because of the nature of 
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decentralized leadership in the network, states are less able to focus repression efforts on 
individual groups and/or leaders. Additionally, Schock contends that “the devolution of 
leadership inhibits the disruption of movement activities when movement leaders are 
imprisoned or murdered,” which means that the opposition movement can continue their 
non-violent action without having to completely recuperate.38  Furthermore, Schock 
contends that as a result of the inclusion of numerous organizations and individuals, 
decentralized networks are typically more democratic, ensuring that every institution or 
individual has a voice in the direction of the movement.  Another benefit of a 
decentralized structure in an opposition network is that it allows for the development of a 
common goal, which helps to minimize conflict between diverse organizations and 
individuals.  Lastly, Schock claims that decentralized networks are organized in a manner 
that enhances “flexibility and the capacity for horizontal information flow,” which 
permits the movement to innovate strategically and implement a greater variety of 
methods more easily than “more bureaucratically structured and ideologically rigid” 
movements.39  Additionally, the decentralization of the opposition network allows for 
peaceful resolutions when conflicts arise between network leaders and/or organizations.  
The democratic nature of decentralized leadership signifies that when conflicts among 
leaders and/ors organizations happen that the entire organization or movement works 
towards the resolution of the issue.   
 Schock concluded that decentralized leadership benefits the resilience of a 
movement by examining the organization of opposition networks in South Africa, the 
Philippines, Nepal, Thailand, Burma and China.  In South Africa, Schock discovered that 
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the United Democratic Front (UDF), coordinated several opposition movements at a local 
level to develop a nationwide movement.  This signifies that the UDF created a 
nationwide anti-apartheid movement by simply managing a variety of local opposition 
networks, which made it difficult for the regime to repress the movement, since it was 
divided among multiple organizations.40  The movements in the Philippines and Thailand 
both had groups, Bayan and the Campaign for Popular Democracy (CPD) respectively; 
act as nationwide umbrella organizations that were each able to consolidate diverse 
institutions into a single collective opposition movement.41  In Nepal, the non-violent 
movement formed a federation of political opposition institutions that worked together to 
produce political transition.  These four instances of decentralized structure in non-
violent movements showed that distributed leadership provided numerous advantages 
that increased the potential for the success of the non-violent action.42  Conversely, the 
non-violent action in Burma and China lacked an organized, but decentralized structure 
in the opposition network, which allowed for the regimes to efficiently repress individual 
movements, organizations, and activists.43 
 Relevant to Schock’s analysis of decentralized networks in non-violent 
movements and the consequential impact on their outcomes is Keck and Sikkink’s 
Boomerang Model, discussed in last section.  An important aspect of the Boomerang 
Model is that the transnational protests are not led by a single group or individual, but 
typically by Transnational Advocacy Networks, which consist of individuals, non-
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governmental organizations, and sometimes other states.44 This implies that non-violent 
movements supported by non-governmental organizations are more likely to have 
decentralized leadership within the network, since there are multiple organizations 
participating in the movement. For example, the rubber tappers in the Amazon case 
displayed a decentralized TAN that consisted of the local rubber tappers, the National 
Council of Rubber Tappers, other local and international labor unions, the Catholic 
Church, and American environmentalists, all of which shared leadership responsibilities 
for the movement.45  In line with Schock’s theory, Keck and Sikkink attribute the success 
of transnational protests to the ability of TANs to organize and to apply pressure on the 
restrictive state from outside the domestic arena.  Additionally, it is important to note that 
in cases of successful non-violent action that although a particular organization or 
individual may initiate the movement, the leadership typically becomes more 
decentralized with the addition of other individuals and organizations.  The leadership of 
the opposition network undergoes decentralization as a result of the tendency of non-
violent movements to be more democratic in nature, which signifies that new members to 
the opposition network are given the opportunity to influence the direction of the 
movement.  
 2.6 Leverage and Resilience in Non-violent Revolutions 
 The third factor that Schock presents that enables success in non-violent 
revolutions is the leverage and resilience abilities of the movement.  As mentioned in the 
first chapter, leverage is the “ability of contentious actors to mobilize the withdrawal of 
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support from opponents or invoke pressure against them through the networks upon 
which opponents depend for their power.”46  Schock describes resilience as the ability of 
non-violent movements to persist in the face of consistent repression efforts by the 
restrictive regime.  These concepts relay the importance of the balance of power in the 
relationship between the regime and the citizens in a state, because a more vulnerable 
regime pressured by opposition networks with raised leverage and resilience capabilities 
is more likely to enable success.   
 “The probability that an unarmed insurrection will tip the balance of power in 
favor of the challengers is a function of its leverage and resilience,” states Schock, 
regarding the impact of leverage and resilience on the success of non-violent action.47  
Schock contends that leverage and resilience directly influence the power relationship 
between the government and the opposition network, with the ability to shift power to 
either party.  Schock’s principal assertion is that if a movement has enhanced leverage 
and resilience capabilities, non-violent action is more likely to succeed, since the 
opposition network is capable of withdrawing support of the regime making it unable to 
effectively operate.  
 One of the two concepts that comprises Schock’s third factor that enables success 
in non-violent movements is the concept of leverage.  This “refers to the ability of 
contentious actors to mobilize the withdrawal of support from opponents or invoke 
pressure against them through the networks upon which opponents depend for their 
power.”48  This signifies that if a pro-democracy movement mobilizes or withdraws 
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support from the government, especially from international and domestic civil-society 
institutions, the balance of power can shift in favor of the opposition network.  The shift 
in the balance of power between the government and the pro-democracy movement 
enables the opposition network to slow or halt government operations, as the government 
is not able to rule without the obedience and cooperation of its citizens.   
 The second concept of Schock’s third factor that enables success in non-violent 
movements is resilience, which “refers to the capacity of contentious actors to continue to 
mobilize collective action despite the actions of opponents aimed at constraining or 
inhibiting their activities.”  This concept emphasizes the ability of a non-violent 
movement to overcome repression attempts by the government, which acts to “tip the 
balance of power in favor of the challengers.”  The resilience of a non-violent movement 
is directly related to its leverage capabilities, as Schock states “the more resilient a 
challenge, the greater the likelihood that it will be able to mobilize the withdrawal of 
support or generate pressure against the state through networks upon which the state 
depends for its resources and legitimacy.”49  One factor that can influence the resiliency 
of a non-violent movement, discussed in Chapter 4, is the level of decentralization in the 
leadership structure of the opposition network.  Decentralized leadership in a non-violent 
movement signifies that the government is unable to target a specific individual or 
organization, which also means that the opposition network is able to continue normal 
operations when leaders are imprisoned or assassinated.  This signifies that Schock’s 
second factor, the ability of an opposition network to decentralize its leadership, directly 
influences the leverage and resilience abilities of a non-violent movement. 
                                                
49 Ibid., p. 144. 
29 
 In addition to the level of decentralization of the opposition network, the ability to 
implement multiple non-violent techniques from across the three methods of non-violent 
action, the ability to implement methods of dispersion as well as methods of 
concentration, and tactical innovation are also factors that affect the leverage and 
resilience abilities of a non-violent movement.  Schock claims “the implementation of a 
diverse range of actions across the various methods of non-violent action diffuses the 
state’s repression, thereby lessening its effectiveness.”  Furthermore, “incorporating 
multiple methods of non-violent action also makes it easier for the challengers to shift the 
emphasis from one set of methods to another when the state focuses its repressive 
capacities on a particular set of actions.”  Additionally, the ability to shift between 
methods of dispersion and methods of concentration means that the government is unable 
to focus its police and military forces on a certain event or place, as the opposition 
network could mobilize its people in at a different event or place.  The ability of a non-
violent movement to shift its resources and people from one event and place to another 
means that not only does it help limit the effect of the repression attempts by the 
government, but the government’s power is weakened since its resources are exhausted 
trying to repress these protests in a variety of locations.  The ability of an opposition 
network to tactically innovate “keeps the authorities off balance and prevent the 
challenge from stagnating” by not allowing the state to adapt to and counter certain 
methods.50   
 In order to understand the impact of leverage and resilience on the success of the 
non-violent movements in Poland and Serbia, I will examine Schock’s findings regarding 
the relationship between the leverage and resilience abilities in his six cases and the 
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potential success of the six movements.  Schock determined that in South Africa, the non-
violent movement, primarily led by the United Democratic Front (UDF) and the 
Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU), enhanced its leverage and 
resilience capacity through the utilization of a decentralized leadership structure, the 
employment of “a wide range of actions across the three methods of nonviolent action,” 
and the implementation of methods of dispersion and concentration.  The improved 
leverage and resilience abilities of the non-violent movement in South Africa “stripped 
the regime of legitimacy, contributed to the condemnation of the apartheid regime by 
third parties, and triggered increased international sanctions.”51  In the Philippines, 
Schock found that Bayan used a “range of methods” and “responded innovatively to 
government repression,” along with the implementation of a method of dispersion called 
the welgang bayan, resulted in enhanced resilience and leverage abilities that contributed 
to the success of the non-violent action.52   
 In Nepal, the non-violent movements increased its resilience and leverage 
capabilities by utilizing “a range of actions across the three methods of nonviolent 
action” and “innovatively responded to government repression through techniques such 
as blackouts and lightning demonstrations,” which contributed to the undermining of the 
state’s “resources, legitimacy, and ability to rule” that “were effective in overthrowing 
the regime.”53  Similarly, Schock discovered that the leverage and resilience capacity of 
the non-violent movement in Thailand was boosted by a “decentralized leadership 
structure and tactical innovation,” which contributed to the success of the non-violent 
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action.54  Conversely, the non-violent movements in Burma and China failed to 
implement a range of non-violent actions, methods of dispersion and concentration, and a 
decentralized leadership structure.  Consequently, the two movements were unable to 
overcome repression and international isolation, which contributed to the failure of the 
non-violent action.55   
 In the six cases that Schock tested in Unarmed Insurrections, the four successful 
non-violent movements were able to enhance their leverage and resilience capabilities, 
while the unsuccessful non-violent movements in Burma and China did not.  In the four 
successful cases, the non-violent movements implemented a range of actions across the 
three methods of non-violent action, utilized a decentralized leadership structure, 
employed methods of dispersion and concentration, and tactically innovated.  The next 
two sections will examine the non-violent movements in Poland and Serbia to determine 
if a link was present between civil-society institutions and the challengers and the 
consequential impact on the success of the non-violent action.  By practicing these 
techniques and strategies, the non-violent movements in South Africa, the Philippines, 
Nepal, and Thailand were able to greatly enhance their leverage and resilience 
capabilities, which contributed to the success of the non-violent action.   
 Another factor that Schock argues could impact the leverage and resilience of a 
non-violent opposition network is the ability to implement “political jiu-jitsu:”56 to turn 
repression efforts by the regime into increased support for the opposition movement.  
Sharp states that “exposing the violence of the state in contrast to the nonviolence of 
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protesters casts the state in a negative light and may lead to shifts in opinion that alter 
power relations.”57  “Political jiu-jitsu” acts to increase the regime’s sensitivity to 
pressure, which results in a shift in the power relationship between the challengers and 
the regime.  Keck and Sikkink parallel this concept, as they claim that support for an 
opposition movement could increase its effectiveness if the repression by the regime is 
exposed internationally, which could potentially attract transnational support that could 
provide the movement with valuable resources and support.58  The resources and support 
provided by international governments and non-governmental organizations to non-
violent movements strengthen the resistance capabilities of the movement and lessen the 
ability of the authoritarian regime to continue repression efforts.  Additionally, negative 
international attention could result in political and economic sanctions that would weaken 
the regime’s capacity to remain unaffected by pressure from the opposition. 
2.7 Conclusion 
 The literature on the factors that enable success in non-violent action from a range 
of fields may provide the thesis with a more comprehensive theoretical background, but 
also signifies that theory on the factors that enable success in non-violent movement is 
still limited its in ability to encompass all internal and external factors that impact the 
ability of non-violent action to succeed.  This chapter has discussed literature from 
Schock and other scholars relevant to the three factors that this thesis will test.  Another 
limitation of the literature is that it lacks additional case studies testing Schock’s 
conclusions.  This thesis tests two new cases that supplement the six cases that Schock 
tested in Unarmed Insurrections.   
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 Furthermore, Schock’s theory that a link between the challengers and civil-society 
institutions, along with Keck and Sikkink’s Boomerang Pattern, displays the importance 
of domestic and international NGOs developing a connection with the challengers in 
enabling success in non-violent action.  Schock’s leadership decentralization theory 
focuses more on the operational aspect of the non-violent action, as it explains the 
significance of cooperation among the different civil-society institutions that are present 
in an opposition network in enabling success.  Schock’s third hypothesis, which asserts 
that the leverage and resilience abilities of a non-violent movement can enable success, 
builds on concepts taken from his other two theories.  For example, Schock argues that a 
link between civil-society institutions and the challengers and a decentralized leadership 
structure are some of the factors that contribute to the movements’ ability to increase 
their leverage and resilience capabilities.  Schock’s three hypotheses, along with Sharp’s 
non-violent action theory, create a theoretical framework that explains how and why 
political structures, non-governmental organizations, a link between civil-society and the 
challengers, a decentralized leadership structure, and the leverage and resilience abilities 
of a movement enhance the potential of non-violent action to succeed.  The next three 
chapters will test Schock’s three factors in the cases of Poland and Serbia to determine if 
the three factors enabled the non-violent action to succeed.  
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Chapter 3: Civil Society’s Role in Non-violent Revolutions 
3.1 Chapter Overview 
 In order to assess the role of civil-society institutions in enabling success in non-
violent action, it is necessary to examine the impact of civil-society organizations in the 
non-violent revolutions in Poland and Serbia.  This chapter looks at how civil-society 
institutions were involved in the opposition movements in Poland and Serbia and what 
impact they had on the success of the movement.  In both these movements, civil-society 
institutions, such as religious organizations, independent trade unions, and student 
groups, helped pressure the regimes to democratize by providing additional resources to 
the movement and attracting international attention that galvanized support.  The next 
section of this chapter outlines Schock’s theory, as it pertains to non-violent revolutions 
in general, and the role it played in the six cases that he analyzed in Unarmed 
Insurrections.  
 Following the overview of Schock’s assessment of the contributions of civil-
society institutions to successful democratization movements, this chapter details the 
participation of civil-society organizations in the pro-democracy movement in Poland 
from 1980 through 1989.  The next section explores the impact of civil-society 
institutions on the non-violent uprising in Serbia starting in 1999, and concluding with 
the resignation of Slobodan Milosevic in October, 2000.  These sections examine the 
leadership and organizers of the major campaigns and events of the movements and the 
level of participation of civil-society organizations to discover how civil-society 
institutions aided the movement.  The leadership of the movement is important to 
examine because it shows the level of involvement of domestic and transnational civil-
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society institutions in the major non-violent campaigns and events.  By focusing on 
leadership, this research will determine what individuals and/or organizations were 
primarily responsible for the major non-violent campaigns and events and how such 
events contributed to political outcomes. The chapter concludes with an overview of 
civil-society involvement in the revolutions in Poland and Serbia and whether Schock’s 
theory, which links civil-society institutions and challengers’ success, holds true for the 
two cases.   
3.2 The Link Between Civil-Society Institutions and Challengers in Non-violent Action 
 The link between civil-society institutions and the challengers, according to 
Schock, is the development of an informal alliance between non-governmental 
organizations and the challengers, which is responsible for the pooling of resources, 
information sharing, coordinating non-violent action, and even providing additional 
leadership to the movement.59  Schock contends that a link between civil society and the 
opposition movement strengthens the ability of non-violent movements to succeed, 
because of the heightened amounts of participation, resources, and media attention were 
able to enhance support for the movement.  The next two sections will investigate the 
extent of the development of a link between civil-society institutions and the challengers 
in Poland and Serbia to determine whether Schock’s first dependent variable contributed 
to their success.  
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3.3 The Role of Solidarity and Other Civil-Society Institutions in Poland 1980 – 1989 
 In Poland, between 1980 and 1989, workers’ unions and other civil-society 
organizations rose up against the regime.  The non-violent movement in Poland in the 
1980s saw the development of multiple civil-society institutions, especially Solidarity 
(SOL) founded in late 1980.60  These organizations helped shift the balance of power 
between the opposition and the regime in favor of pro-democracy movement through 
aiding the ability of the movement to resist repression attempts and to help mobilize more 
resources and people to organize larger protest events more often.61  Starting with an 
introduction into pre-movement Polish civil-society, this section explores the 
participation of civil-society institutions in the major campaigns and events throughout 
the movement and, consequently, what impact the link between these organizations and 
the challengers had on the success of the movement.    
Pre-Solidarity Civil Society in Poland 
 Prior to 1980, civil-society institutions were typically government front 
organizations or were weak to the point of inaction.  Any civil-society institution, such as 
religious groups and trade unions, were powerless, especially in any attempt to challenge 
the regime.  The Henryk Jab!o"ski regime, from 1972 to 1985, was able to effectively 
limit the operational capacity of any opposition organizations, primarily through 
repression and isolation, up until the beginning of 1980.62  In the mid-1970s, the first 
wave of strikes by factory workers broke out across Poland protesting a rise in food 
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prices, but was only moderately successful, in that the Soviet Union forced regime 
resignations and reversed policy that only temporarily stabilized food prices and 
unemployment rates.  In the next year, any further strikes by factory workers were 
quelled by government repression and by a lack of organization by the factory workers, 
resulting in the return to the policies that had caused the first wave of strikes.63 Towards 
the beginning of the 1980s, continued repression, decreasing wages, and further price 
increases resulted in the formation of an opposition movement, which consisted of the 
civil-society institution Solidarity, which also acted as an umbrella organization for 
twenty-three civil-society institutions, pro-democracy activists, who were primarily non-
labor-industry individuals, such as students and the unemployed, and international civil-
society institutions, like the American Federation of Labor and Congress of International 
Organizations (AFL-CIO).  The next section examines the link between these civil-
society institutions and the challengers in Poland from 1980 through 1989. 
The Introduction and Development of an Active Civil Society in Poland 
 What this study found throughout the research was that after the mostly 
unsuccessful protests in the 1970s, the workers in Poland learned that uncoordinated 
responses and violence were ineffective.  In September 1980, after years of continued 
repression, especially with regards to labor, the workers at a shipyard in Gdansk founded 
Solidarity, whose official name is the Independent Self-governing Trade Union.  The 
founding of Solidarity, a local trade union, independent of government control, signified 
the real beginning of an active civil society in Poland.  Independent trade unions rapidly 
spread and, by the end of 1980, Solidarity represented trade unions in 37 different regions 
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across Poland.  Participation in Solidarity aided in the development of the link between 
domestic civil-society institutions and the challengers nationwide.64  By acting as an 
umbrella institution for all independent trade unions, Solidarity was able to spread 
information and innovate strategically, such as by shifting protest methods from strikes 
alone to using over one hundred vehicles to blockade Warsaw in August, 1981,65 and to 
boycotting the 1985 parliamentary elections.66  
 In researching the major campaigns and events of the Polish non-violent 
movement between 1980 and 1989, this study discovered that although Solidarity 
originated as a workers’ organization, it was able to work together with civil-society 
institutions from different ideological and social backgrounds, such as academic 
organizations, religious organizations, and political organizations.67  The collaboration 
between these civil-society institutions was possible because the groups were able to 
focus on a common goal of instituting a more democratic political system, instead of 
targeting different objectives.68   
 Towards the end of 1980, civil-society organizations gradually became more 
engaged in the collection and mobilization of event-planning information and counter-
intelligence, resources, and people.  The initial success of Solidarity during the labor 
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strikes of the early-1980’s helped to inspire increased development and engagement of 
civil-society institutions into the non-violent movement.69  The first key instance of a link 
between civil-society institutions and the protesters was on January 24, 1981, when the 
largest of the Free Saturday strikes occurred, in which workers stayed home as opposed 
to going to work.  Although this was the third of the Free Saturday strikes, civil-society 
institutions, such as the organizations consolidated under Solidarity, acted as a liaison 
between the different factories, shipyards, and plants nationwide spreading information 
regarding strategy, methods, and leadership decisions.  The third Free Saturday strike was 
far more coordinated than the previous two Free Saturday strikes and as a result, it was 
estimated that over seven million workers participated, meaning that many industries 
nationwide were incapable of functioning normally.70  After the success of the third Free 
Saturday strike, the movement organized a wave of general strikes lasting from January 
28 through February, led by Solidarity and a few other domestic civil-society institutions, 
with participation peaking at 250,000 for a few of the events.  
 In August 1981, another wave of protests broke out in Warsaw, but in addition to 
the typical use of strikes, these protests utilized vehicles, people, and other objects to 
form a blockade around the city center.  Approximately 100,000 people participated in 
the blockade, which basically resulted in the city government halting operations.71  A 
significant aspect of the blockades and protests was the role of domestic civil-society 
institutions in organizing the people and events and implementing new strategies to 
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prevent the police and military from stopping the non-violent action.  These domestic 
civil-society groups provided the movement with vehicles, people, and other resources 
that made the blockade possible, since the individual challengers and activists were 
unable to provide such resources. An instance of domestic civil-society organizations 
providing resources where the challengers could not occurred at the city center blockade 
protest, when groups like the Charitable Commission of the Episcopate (KCEP), the 
domestic representative of the Roman Catholic Church, provided large vans to the 
challengers, which were typically used for transporting the elderly around the community 
and turned them into sizeable roadblocks.72    
Martial Law and the Impact of Transnational Civil-Society Institutions 
 As a result of increased non-violent campaigns and protests, aided by the 
participation of domestic civil-society organizations, the Jab!o"ski regime declared 
martial law and banned the operation of most domestic civil-society institutions, 
especially Solidarity.  At this time, civil-society institutions were forced to operate 
underground if they wanted to continue their non-violent action.  In order to survive and 
operate underground, domestic civil-society groups maintained their relationships with 
one another through secret meetings, conversations, and coded messages, but the 
underground movement was largely sustained by assistance from international non-
governmental organizations, which took over some of the responsibilities of the 
challengers, such as resource collection and protest organizing that allowed the domestic 
opposition network to remain out of the government’s spotlight.  International non-
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governmental organizations organized protests in Poland by communicating information 
and needs to the underground domestic groups and their supporters, pooling international 
resources for the events, and spreading the word throughout the opposition network.  For 
example, international civil-society institutions, like Pomost and the Polish-American 
Congress, held repeated demonstrations in Chicago and raised over a million dollars that 
was sent to the opposition network in Poland through intermediaries.73  
 With the prohibition of domestic civil-society institutions in Poland, support from 
a wide variety of international organizations and locations enabled the pro-democracy 
movement to continue its progress.  Although the Roman Catholic Church had already 
been instrumental in the movement, numerous other international civil-society 
institutions joined the movement.  American religious organizations, such as Church 
World Services (CWS) and Lutheran World Relief (LWR), sent blankets, quilts, clothing, 
soap, and water cleansing pills to Solidarity.74  In addition to providing funds for office 
and publishing supplies, the AFL-CIO also sent Solidarity cassette recorders, radios, 
base-station antennas, and other electronic equipment.75   
 Although the protests and strikes gained international attention, the declaration of 
martial law by the Jab!o"ski regime attracted even greater interest from international 
organizations, other states, such as the United States and the Vatican, and transnational 
civil-society institutions.76  International civil-society institutions, especially those related 
directly to the Roman Catholic Church, like the National Catholic Union (ZNA), formed 
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an underground network with Solidarity and other domestic groups that allowed the 
movement to persist in the face of repression attempts by the government.77 Another 
important addition to the opposition network in late-1981 was Rural Solidarity (SRI), 
which incorporated a large portion of Polish farmers.   
 One of the most significant features of the underground opposition network was 
that it was able to form parallel political, social, and economic institutions, such as an 
underground newspaper and radio broadcast, which acted as the media representative for 
the opposition movement, since the official media were government-run.  This meant that 
the opposition network had structured institutions that paralleled the government-run 
institutions.  Additionally, Solidarity had a coordinating office, which handled the 
institutional operations of the organization, such as the collection and disbursement of 
donations.  Furthermore, since protesters and strikers were occasionally arrested, the 
opposition network, through the assistance of international non-governmental 
organizations, such as the Polish Legal Defense Fund, provided legal aid that was 
typically denied by the state.78   
These institutions allowed the movement to delegate event planning and 
fundraising to different organizations and groups, which meant that the opposition 
network could focus on the non-violent action instead of concerning itself with 
administrative matters.  Also, these parallel institutions made it possible for funds and 
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supplies coming into Poland to reach the opposition network more easily, because the 
resources no longer needed to pass through government entities that would typically 
confiscate them.79    
 Between 1982 and 1985, domestic civil-society institutions grew marginally, but 
the influx of transnational civil-society institutions to the opposition network allowed the 
network to grow by providing additional resources, ideas, and leadership to the 
movement.80  Even though the opposition remained underground, the movement was able 
to continue to function normally and organized and led several pro-democracy protests, 
with an estimated 60,000 protesters at some events.81  The introduction of liberal reforms 
in the Warsaw Pact countries and the continued non-violent protests in Poland in 1984 
through 1985 placed enough pressure on the Jab!o"ski regime that the Council of the 
State of Poland chose Wojciech Jaruzelski to replace Jab!o"ski as chairman in 1985, 
because the council believed that Jaruzelski would use greater military force to stabilize 
Poland’s political situation.82   
The Jaruzelski Regime and Political Transition 
 The appointment of Jaruzelski had numerous implications for the role of domestic 
and international civil-society institutions as part of the non-violent opposition 
movement.  A major point of divergence between Jab!o"ski and Jaruzelski was that 
Jab!o"ski came from an academic background, whereas Jaruzelski was a career military 
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officer and was thus much more militant toward protests and resistance.  The opposition 
movement, if it wanted to continue to pressure the regime, had to forge a stronger 
network of civil-society organizations and challengers.  The ability of the movement to 
persist in the face of more extensive repression efforts by the regime is displayed through 
increased participation by civil-society organizations after 1985.  Strikes, protests, 
student sit-ins, and media campaigns could continue normally, as a result of the growth 
and inclusion of domestic and transnational civil-society institutions in the movement.83   
 By 1988, the movement was at its most powerful, enacting protests, campaigns, 
and other events daily, with participation well in the thousands per event.  From 1985 to 
1988, the majority of domestic civil-society groups operated underground, but 
transnational civil-society organizations took a prominent role in the movement, even 
bringing in support from the Roman Catholic Church at its highest level, as the Pope 
spoke in favor of the opposition movement.  The Pope’s visit to Poland in 1987 and the 
support he gave the Solidarity movement raised morale and inspired a large number of 
Polish citizens to participate in the movement.84  Outside of the domestic civil-society 
organizations, like Solidarity, Rural Solidarity, and the Workers’ Defense Committee 
(KOR), transnational civil-society institutions, like Radio Free Europe (RFE) and Project 
Hope, supplied the movement with moral support, along with financial support, gathered 
primarily through international donations, and medical supplies to the challengers.  Since 
Solidarity’s ideological perspectives, such as dedication to the common good and the 
interconnectivity of all people, were derived from Catholic Social Thought, this meant 
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that religious civil-society organizations, such as those related to the Roman Catholic 
Church, were more likely to support the movement.85   
 An additional benefit of the involvement of transnational civil-society institutions 
was that since they were previously connected to the Polish people, the challengers were 
typically more accepting of the leadership, ideas, and strategy of these groups.  In other 
words, prior familiarity with these organizations made it easier for people to trust and 
identify with these groups, making it easier for these groups to mobilize people and 
resources when they became involved in the opposition network.86  Notably, the Roman 
Catholic Church had a deep connection with a large number of Polish citizens prior to the 
opposition movement, which meant that when the opposition movement began, the 
challengers already had familiarity with the Catholic civil-society institutions making it 
easier for the challengers to know how to communicate and work with the organizations.  
Even after the legalization of Solidarity and other groups during the roundtable talks with 
the Jaruzelski regime in 1989, civil-society institutions continued to collaborate closely 
with non-affiliated pro-democracy individuals and activists, through the same channels 
used during the underground years, until the political transition was complete.  
 The pro-democracy movement in Poland in the 1980s was not isolated from 
external and internal political and economic factors, but these factors only supplemented 
the development of a link between civil-society institutions and the Polish challengers.  
As Poland experienced after the increase in meat prices, economic crises caused people 
who were previously inactive in the movement to become rapidly radicalized and joined 
civil-society institutions, like Solidarity and Group Against Job Discrimination (GAB), or 
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formed their own organizations.  Additionally, the replacement of Jab!o"ski with a more 
militant leader in Jaruzelski implied that the regime would order more aggressive 
repression efforts. This brought more people into the movement, since people became 
increasingly outraged with the force that the government used to respond to the non-
violent action.87  The economic recession and the regime transition in Poland provided 
“political opportunities” that the non-violent movement used to strengthen the opposition 
network, while weakening the Polish government’s repression abilities.   The 
relationships among political elites were fractured on multiple levels, as leaders in the 
Polish United Workers’ Party and the Soviet Union were split on the recent regime 
transition and how to handle the recession.88  The instability of alliances among the 
political elites weakened the political system’s underlying power relations that created a 
“political opportunity structure” that the non-violent movement capitalized on.89   
 In the 1980’s, international and domestic civil-society institutions developed a 
link with the challengers in the pro-democracy movement in Poland that contributed to 
the success of the non-violent action.  Independent labor unions, like Solidarity, and 
international non-governmental organizations, like Pomost and the KCEP, and 
government-funded organizations, like the National Endowment for Democracy, 
provided funds and leadership to the opposition network, which succeeded in 
implementing democratic institutions and features, such as pluralism, which is the 
development and active participation of competing political parties and interest groups in 
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the political system.  Although domestic civil-society institutions, especially Solidarity, 
were the foundation of the movement from 1980 until 1989, international civil-society 
institutions supplemented the opposition network financially and physically, especially 
during the prohibition of domestic civil-society institutions from 1982 to 1988.  The 
domestic and international civil-society institutions connected with the challengers to 
strengthen the non-violent movement in Poland that contributed to the success of the non-
violent action by providing additional resources, participants, and international attention, 
which helped strengthen the movement’s operational and persistence abilities.90   
3.4 Civil-Society Institutions in the Serbian Transition to Democracy 1999 – 2000 
 The non-violent action in Serbia from 1999 to 2000 that resulted in the overthrow 
of the Slobodan Milosevic regime was characterized by the overwhelming influence of 
domestic and civil-society organizations.  In a manner similar to Poland in the 1980s, 
civil-society groups played a direct role in the ability of the non-violent movement to 
mobilize and to resist severe repression attempts from the Milosevic regime.  In addition 
to leadership from the youth organization Otpor! (Resistance! in English), the opposition 
network consisted of several international non-governmental organizations, primarily 
from the human rights sector, and the Democratic Opposition of Serbia, a coalition of 
opposition political parties.91  Through an analysis of the major campaigns and events of 
the non-violent movement, this section details the role of both domestic and international 
civil-society institutions in the non-violent movement and consequentially what impact 
they might have had on the success of the action.   
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Civil-Society Institutions in Serbia prior to 1999 
 Before 1999, there was a wave of non-violent protests in Serbia in response to 
widely disputed election results that kept the Milosevic regime in power.  In November 
1996, students in Ni# began a series of protests against a new government policy that 
made the state responsible for the appointment of all university professors and were 
quickly joined by other students from all of Serbia, especially in the capital, Belgrade.92  
These protests were easily repressed by the Milosevic regime, due primarily to the 
inability of the students to form a network among themselves, and with Zajedno 
(Together, in English), which was a network formed by the political opponents of the 
regime.  The inability of the protesters to form a network was primarily the product of a 
lack of protest experience and knowledge of protest strategies and techniques among the 
students and the Zajedno coalition.93  This lack of cooperation among the opposition, 
combined with a lack of international support from non-governmental organizations 
severely limited the operational capacity of the pro-democracy protesters.  The majority 
of international non-governmental organizations, such as the Open Society Institute and 
Freedom House, did not become involved in the pro-democracy protests at this point, 
since the Milosevic regime managed to isolate Serbia from international attention.  As a 
consequence of civil-society institutions not participating in the movement, the student 
movement and Zajedno had difficulties collecting and mobilizing resources and people, 
sharing information, and developing strategy.  These problems allowed the Milosevic 
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regime to easily divide the movement, imprison the leadership, and use military and 
police forces to effectively shut down any attempted protests.94   
Domestic Civil-Society Institutions and the Non-violent Movement, 1999-2000 
 After the failed non-violent protests from 1996 through 1997, opposition in Serbia 
was quieted, but in 1998, Otpor! was founded in opposition to a series of restrictive laws 
at the University of Belgrade that limited freedom of press and speech.  Although this 
student organization was founded because of problems at the university, the movement 
quickly refocused its efforts towards the Milosevic regime as the origin of the majority of 
problems in Serbia.  As with the previous attempt at non-violent action, Otpor! lacked 
organization and leadership, which threatened the success of the movement from the 
beginning, as early pro-democracy protests were troubled by weak mobilization and 
resilience abilities.  Starting in June 1999, the anti-Milosevic regime protests, led by 
Otpor!, had poor participation and was once again easily limited by repression.  
Following a reorganization process that included a more democratic leadership structure, 
development of its own media institutions—including a paper and a variety of other 
printed material—and a revised strategy, developed directly from the Politics of 
Nonviolent Action by Gene Sharp, Otpor! became increasingly active in the pro-
democracy movement.95  By instituting a more democratic leadership structure, the pro-
democracy movement enhanced its ability to avoid government repression, a process 
examined in greater detail in the next two chapters.        
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 An important aspect of the composition of the Serbian opposition network was 
that although there were only a few domestic civil-society organizations involved in the 
network, they were deeply connected to the challengers throughout the entire movement.  
Even non-politically oriented groups, such as the fan club of the Red Star Belgrade 
soccer team, provided the protesters in Belgrade with electronic devices to monitor police 
radio transmissions.96  Additionally, the Open Society Institute’s Belgrade office taught 
students and other ambitious activists about non-violent methods, global democracy 
movements, and past human-rights campaigns.97  The link between civil-society 
institutions and the pro-democracy challengers is relatively apparent, since the majority 
of resources, people, information, strategy, and action originated from Otpor!.  This 
indicates that not only was Otpor! a key member in the opposition network, but also that 
prior to the arrival of international civil-society institutions that it was the principal force 
behind the movement.  From late-1999 on, domestic civil-society institutions, especially 
youth organizations, would continue to connect with the regime challengers, but would 
gain assistance from several international organizations.98   
The Role of Transnational Non-Governmental Organizations in the Opposition Network 
 In the first few months of 2000 an international dimension was added to the 
opposition network, as a multitude of transnational civil-society institutions entered the 
movement, including human rights organizations and election monitoring groups, like the 
Center for Free Elections and Democracy (CESID).  Excluding the rock concert rally in 
November 1999, international civil-society organizations were essentially not involved in 
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the movement until April 2000, when they took a direct role in the mobilization of people 
and resources for the pro-democracy protests.  From April 2000 through September 2000, 
transnational civil-society institutions, such as Human Rights Watch and Amnesty 
International, formed a network with Otpor! and an alliance of opposition political 
parties, the Democratic Opposition of Serbia (DOS) that was responsible for the 
coordination of most protests, events, and media campaigns.99  The contributions of the 
international non-governmental organizations were crucial to the success of the non-
violent action, since they were able to attract international attention that would focus 
global pressure on the Milosevic regime, without experiencing the same level of 
repression as the domestic groups.  The global pressure that was focused on the 
Milosevic regime in Serbia included political and economic sanctions, official 
denunciations, and increasingly negative international press.   
 One of the largest benefits of the inclusion of transnational civil-society 
organizations was that they provided the opposition network with greater communication 
and press capabilities.  Although the domestic opposition network was able to develop 
parallel media institutions, such as a newspaper, the Drevni Telegraf, their ability to reach 
wider audiences outside of Serbia was extremely limited.  After joining the non-violent 
movement in Serbia, transnational civil-society institutions were rapidly able to attract 
greater international attention to the situation, which in return helped minimize the 
attempts of the Milosevic regime to isolate the country, especially from the United States 
and Western Europe.  Organizations like the Institute for War and Peace Reporting, 
Freedom House, and Human Rights Watch amplified the voices of the movement with a 
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continuous supply of reports on the non-violent action to the international community.  It 
was important to the Milosevic regime to attempt to isolate Serbia  because it would 
allow the regime to continue repression without criticism from the international 
community, especially from political and economic allies like Russia, due to the 
government’s violations of civil and human rights.100   
 In the Serbian non-violent movement against the Milosevic regime, transnational 
civil-society institutions developed operational links with both the domestic civil-society 
organizations and the challengers.  On September 27, 2000, the direct connection 
between these international groups and the challengers was seen as these transnational 
civil-society institutions, especially CESID, provided transportation and other resources 
necessary to create a strong protest against the election outcome in Belgrade.101  Over one 
hundred thousand people participated in the pro-democracy protests, including 
approximately 30,000 election monitors from both domestic and international civil-
society institutions, such as CESID, Exit 2000, DOS, and Otpor!.  In addition to 
supporting a “Get Out the Vote” campaign across Serbia prior to the election, human 
rights groups and election monitoring NGOs also participated heavily in the post-election 
protests after Milosevic claimed a successful re-election.102   
 In the beginning of October, citizens across Serbia took part in protests and 
workers went on mass strikes nationwide, most notably the workers at the Kolubara 
mines, which were previously strong supporters of the Milosevic regime.  Since non-
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government unionization was rare in Serbia, these workers coordinated protests, 
campaigns, and economic boycotts with DOS and Otpor! in order to ensure that the 
strikes would effectively pressure the regime.  Since both Poland and Serbia were heavily 
industrialized countries, the economies of both countries depended on factories and mines 
operating normally.  In both Poland and Serbia, the industrial nature of the countries 
signifies that strikes could more effectively impact the economy, pressuring the 
government to resolve the conflict.   
   Unlike the laborers in Poland, the mineworkers in Serbia were not responsible 
for the commencement of the movement, but joined towards the very end of the 
movement to provide a final blow to the regime.  In the beginning of October 2000, 
industries across Serbia were all on strike, students continued protests in most cities, and 
transnational NGOs continued to help focus international attention on the situation.103  By 
October 5, 2000, the opposition network was basically able to freeze normal activity in 
Serbia, including a full-scale blockade in Belgrade, which gained notoriety for having a 
bulldozer at the protests that quickly became a symbol for the movement.104  In addition 
to the opposition network’s connection with the challengers, a large portion of the 
domestic police and military forces joined the movement in the first week of October 
2000.  This signified that the movement had become so powerful that it was even able to 
convince the regime’s forces, which had previously followed orders, to join the 
movement.105  The connection between the challengers and domestic and international 
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civil-society institutions meant that the opposition network was more able to successfully 
mobilize, resist repression, and garner international support.   
3.5 Conclusion 
 This chapter compared the non-violent movements in Poland and Serbia and 
whether these movements follow Schock’s explanation of the link between civil-society 
organizations and the challengers and movement success.  This research is not able to 
definitively conclude that a link between civil-society institutions and the challengers 
determines whether non-violent action will succeed, but civil-society institutions, ranging 
from religious groups to student organizations, were heavily involved in the opposition 
network, and this involvement increased the potential for success in these two 
movements.  This is because the civil-society groups provided the opposition network 
with funding, additional leadership, material resources, technology, publishing materials, 
and international attention that enhanced the ability of the movement to organize events, 
mobilize protesters, and avoid repression.   
 While the link between civil-society institutions and the challengers supplied the 
pro-democracy movement in Serbia with enhanced resilience there were other factors, 
such as the declining economy and the war involving Serbia, as they providing a political 
opening that the non-violent movement utilized to its benefit.  The economic crisis and 
war divided political leaders within the Serbian government, which impaired the 
government’s ability to quickly respond to the non-violent action.  Like the Solidarity 
movement in Poland, the non-violent movement in Serbia benefited from a downturn in 
the economy and political crises that provided additional challengers to the opposition 
network.  The economic downturn in Serbia in early-2000 frustrated thousands of 
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individuals, especially those who became unemployed and then entered the movement by 
joining civil-society institutions to voice their dissatisfaction.   
 Another factor that played an important role in the mobilization of thousands into 
the movement was the ongoing war that Serbia fighting over the Kosovo region that led 
to human rights violations and the bombing of Serbia by NATO forces in 2000, which the 
Milosevic regime was largely blamed for as the war was unpopular among the Serbian 
population.106  As a result, people grew increasingly frustrated with the government 
actions and felt that a democratic political system might prevent the continuation of these 
events.  Although the NATO bombing of Serbia and the economic recession were highly 
influential in the development of a more active citizenry, the main impact was that these 
factors simply aided the development of a link between civil-society institutions and the 
challengers, as they helped increase the involvement of people in the non-violent 
movement.107   
 In Poland, the non-violent movement was able to efficiently mobilize thousands 
of protesters and strikers, rapidly share strategy and information among the opposition 
network, and resist repeated repression attempts.  A significant factor in its ability to 
accomplish these actions was that both domestic and international civil-society 
institutions were able to develop a stable link with the challengers in Poland.  This link 
not only helped in the recruitment of additional protesters and organizations, but it also 
increased the operational and resistance capabilities of the movement in a variety of 
ways, such as improved fundraising and decentralizing the movement’s leadership.  Since 
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the network consisted of more than just individuals, other groups and individuals were 
able to feel more comfortable with entering the movement, because increased 
international participation implied that it was more difficult for repression and isolation 
efforts to succeed.  Additionally, by introducing civil-society institutions with existing 
organizational leadership structures and democratic features to the movement, the 
opposition network began to become more democratic and was able to develop more 
experienced leadership teams throughout the movement.108   
 Another important aspect of the role of civil-society institutions in the movement 
was that during this period, Poland experienced exponential growth in the development 
of domestic civil-society institutions, inspired by the success of Solidarity.  In other 
words, the civil-society institutions were able to help enhance the capabilities of the 
movement, but were also crucial to the development of other civil-society institutions that 
would eventually join the movement.109  Although domestic civil-society institutions, 
such as Solidarity, were instrumental to the success of the movement, international NGOs 
were also vital to the survival of the opposition network, especially during the 
underground years.  International NGOs provided the movement with international 
support, greater financial and material resources, and an influx of new strategy, such as 
the vans and protesters that civil-society institutions related to the Roman Catholic 
Church provided for the blockade of Warsaw in 1981.   
 In Serbia, domestic and transnational civil-society institutions were able to build a 
direct link with the anti-Milosevic regime challengers, which resulted in the increased 
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operational and resistance capacity of the opposition network.  One of the major 
differences between the non-violent action in Poland and Serbia was the composition of 
the opposition network in terms of institutions and individuals.  There was minimal 
development of new domestic civil-society institutions in Serbia before and during the 
movement.  This meant that the majority of individuals wishing to participate in the 
movement did not join another group, which then merged with the opposition network, 
but directly joined the movement.  The pro-democracy movement in Serbia provided an 
umbrella organization in the opposition network for anyone who desired to participate in 
the non-violent action.  The link between non-governmental organizations and the 
challengers aided in the recruitment and mobilization of thousands of Serbian protesters, 
including individuals from a diverse background, with a sizeable portion from outside the 
youth organizations.   
 Finally, the involvement of transnational NGOs in the movement meant that, like 
Poland, the opposition movement in Serbia was able to attract greater international 
interest and increase its power.  International human-rights organizations and domestic 
and international election-monitoring groups provided additional support to the 
opposition network that helped the movement gain greater international attention by 
releasing reports regarding human rights violations and the fraudulent elections.  
 The non-violent movements in Poland and Serbia both display a link between 
civil-society institutions and the challengers, which impacted their potential for success.  
In both movements, assistance from domestic and international civil-society institutions 
provided the opposition network with increased mobilization, operation, and resistance 
capabilities.  The organizations did this by providing additional leadership, financial 
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support, campaign resources, new strategies, international attention, and greater 
participation.  By supplying the movements in Poland and Serbia with these resources, 
the leverage and resilience abilities of the movement were greatly increased, which is 
discussed further in Chapter 5.  The movements, with help from civil-society institutions, 
were more easily able to resist repression and assemble support nationwide in a matter of 
hours by email communications.110   
 Other structural factors, such as economic crises, war, and human rights 
violations, were essential to the success of the movement, but only in the sense that they 
provided supplementary support to the opposition network by increasing the number of 
challengers and participation in civil-society institutions.  The rise in support for the pro-
democracy movement is explained by the political-opportunity-structure theory,111 which 
would emphasize that the opposition network capitalized on the outrage of Serbian 
citizens over the war, human-rights violations, and the economic crisis to gain support for 
the pro-democracy movement.  The war, human-rights violations, and the economic crisis 
made the Serbian citizens more inclined to institute a more democratic system, which 
created a political opportunity that the pro-democracy movement used to its advantage.  
With regard to Schock’s explanation that a link between civil-society institutions and the 
challengers impacts the success of non-violent action, it is possible to conclude that a link 
between civil-society institutions and the challengers enhanced the ability of the 
movements in Poland and Serbia to resist repression, share resources, and mobilize 
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thousands of pro-democracy protesters.  The pro-democracy movements in Poland and 
Serbia capitalized on political opportunities created by regime transition, economic 
crises, and war, which aided the development of the link between civil-society 
institutions and the challengers.   
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Chapter 4: Leadership Structure of Opposition Networks is Non-violent Movements 
4.1 Chapter Overview 
 The second factor that this study analyzes is the leadership structure of the 
opposition network in non-violent movements and if a more decentralized structure can 
increase the potential for the success of non-violent action.  This chapter examines the 
structural composition of the leadership in the non-violent movements in Poland and 
Serbia to determine whether either had a decentralized structure that consisted of multiple 
leaders or leadership teams, working through democratic processes.  Additionally, this 
chapter explores the consequential effects of a decentralized leadership structure on the 
ability of the non-violent action to succeed in these two cases. The next section of this 
chapter summarizes Schock’s theory, as it relates to non-violent revolutions in general, 
and the impact it had in the six cases that he analyzed in Unarmed Insurrections. 
 Following an outline of Schock’s second factor, this chapter analyzes the 
leadership structure of the Solidarity movement in Poland between 1980 and 1989 to 
determine whether the leadership in the movement was divided among different groups 
and individuals.  Then, the next section illustrates the organization of the leadership of 
the pro-democracy movement in Serbia. Both of these parts explore the leadership in the 
major campaigns and events of the movements and any descriptions of the configuration 
of the movements’ leadership detailed in primary and secondary sources.   The chapter 
concludes with an overview of the decentralization of leadership structures in the 
revolutions in Poland and Serbia and whether Schock’s theory, which asserts that 
decentralized leadership in non-violent action is necessary, but not sufficient in enabling 
success, is accurate for these two cases. 
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4.2 Decentralization of the Leadership in Opposition Networks 
 According to Schock, a decentralized leadership structure signifies that a network 
shares leadership responsibilities among the different individuals and organizations of 
that network.112  Schock contends that a decentralized network aids the ability of the non-
violent movement to succeed for five reasons: the inability of the government to focus 
repression efforts on a specific target; it allows for progress when leaders are imprisoned 
or eliminated; the movement becomes increasingly democratic in nature, which promotes 
cooperation and ensures that all members of the movement have a say in the direction of 
the movement; it allows the movement to focus on a common goal, which allows for 
diverse groups to work together while minimizing conflict; and it enhances the ability of 
the movement to innovate strategically, since the organization of the movement enhances 
“flexibility and the capacity for horizontal information flow” and to implement a greater 
variety of methods more easily than “more bureaucratically structured and ideologically 
rigid” movements.113  The next two sections investigate the extent of the decentralization 
of the leadership structure of the non-violent movements in Poland and Serbia to 
determine whether Schock’s second dependent variable was necessary, but not sufficient 
for their success.   
4.3 Organizational Leadership in the Non-Violent Movement in Poland, 1980 – 1989 
 The Solidarity movement in Poland, starting in Gdansk in 1980, eventually 
achieved a peaceful political transition in 1989, because the independent trade union, 
Solidarity, acted as an umbrella organization that coordinated the protest efforts of all 
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pro-democracy strikers.  This section explores the leadership structure of the non-violent 
movement in Poland in the 1980s, through two main methods.  First, this study explains 
leadership throughout the movement, as seen through the major non-violent campaigns 
and events.  Second, this section evaluates the level of decentralization in the leadership 
structure of the opposition network in Poland, by studying primary and secondary sources 
to discover a more in-depth description provided by a variety of authors.     
Leadership in Major Non-violent Campaigns and Events  
 The non-violent action in Poland that took place throughout the 1980s was 
primarily led by Solidarity, but that is only the case because Solidarity acted as an 
umbrella organization for a variety of institutions from the civic, labor, liberal, 
nationalist, religious, nationalist, agricultural, and youth sectors.114  Under Solidarity’s 
umbrella, the spectrum of organizations included religious institutions like the KIK, 
KCEP, and ZNK, student groups, like the Independent Association of Students and 
Young Poland Movement, leftist groups like RPS, and civic groups like the Civic 
Committee to Build a Monument In Honor of Victims of Katyn (KPZ).115  Even prior to 
the founding of Solidarity in 1980, the burgeoning movement still had a decentralized 
leadership structure, but was less organized and unable to coordinate diverse protests.  
Until the meat price strikes in the summer of 1980, the movement had yet to develop a 
leadership structure of any kind, but on August 16, 1980, the Inter-factory Strike 
Committee formed, which would act as the first real organizer and leader of the pro-
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democracy protests.116  Although Lech Walesa, a former employee in the Lenin (Gdansk) 
Shipyard who was fired, initially took leadership of the protests, it was not only Walesa, 
as other activists from that factory joined him as leaders of the strikes, including Lech 
Kaczy"ski and Anna Walentynowicz.  From 1981 through 1982, all of the major non-
violent campaigns and events were led by Solidarity, which does not display any level of 
decentralization in the leadership structure.117  This does not signify that the leadership 
structure of the of opposition network was decentralized, but does require this study to 
investigate first and second-hand accounts of the Solidarity movement, which more 
accurately describes the structure of the network. 
 Starting in 1982, the prohibition of independent trade unions and other civil-
society institutions, through the imposition of martial law, forced the movement 
underground, which is where the protests would continue to originate from until 1988.  
Throughout this time, Solidarity still acted as the leadership for the movement, but with 
assistance from other groups, especially related to the Roman Catholic Church.118  
Although it is difficult to ascertain the level of decentralization in the structure of the 
opposition network throughout this time through these events, this study also needs to 
examine other perspectives to show a clearer explanation of the organization of the 
movement.  After the reemergence of Solidarity and other banned groups in the late-
1980s, the movement primarily stayed under the direction of a single organization, but 
that is only as a result of the consolidation of all the other organizations under a single 
institution, which is shown through an examination of additional sources in the next part.    
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Decentralization of the Leadership in the Solidarity Movement in Poland 
 Since it was difficult to determine whether the leadership structure of the non-
violent movement was decentralized, it is necessary to analyze what authors have 
described about the organization of the opposition network.  Sociologist Maryjane Osa 
provides insight into the organizational ties in the Solidarity movement between 1980 and 
1981 by constructing a network connection figure that shows how the movement quickly 
decentralized its leadership among a total of twenty-three different institutions.119  Osa’s 
interconnectivity graph (Appendix 6) shows the interconnectedness of organizations 
across the network, which includes a variety of organizations, especially Solidarity, the 
Worker’s Defense Committee (KOR), and the Sign organization (ZNK).120  The 
interconnectedness among the diverse organizations implies that although they may have 
consolidated into the Solidarity movement, they were still autonomous institutions that 
each played an important role in the non-violent action.  In other words, the opposition 
movement was led by Solidarity, but Solidarity was not only an individual entity, but also 
a collective of assorted organizations and groups.  By acting as an umbrella organization, 
Solidarity was primarily responsible for the organization and coordination of protest 
efforts, but a variety of groups under the Solidarity movement were responsible for 
numerous duties, including leading local, regional, and national protests.  One example of 
the duties undertaken by organizations under Solidarity’s umbrella is that organizations, 
like the Movement for Defense of Human and Civic Rights (ROP) and the Sign (ZNK), 
published periodicals that provided a wide array of information for protesters and 
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international spectators, such as meeting times, protest information, and descriptions and 
results of the latest events.121   
 Throughout the following decade, scores of civil-society institutions began to 
develop and join the Solidarity movement, each taking a unique role in the leadership of 
the movement, further decentralizing the leadership structure in the opposition network.  
As a result of the continual addition of new and diverse organizations, it was essential for 
the Solidarity movement to ensure that each group was able to take an active role in the 
leadership of the non-violent action.  One manner that the pro-democracy movement 
attempted to democratize aspects of the movement was the creation of groups of leaders 
from different organizations that would work together to come up with solutions.  
Although Lech Walesa and the Solidarity institution were the leading voice behind the 
opposition network, Walesa was supported by several other organizations from numerous 
areas, especially from the Workers’ Defense Committee (KOR) and the Movement of 
Free Democrats (RWD).122  An important representation of the level of decentralization 
in the leadership structure in the opposition network was that in 1981 Walesa was 
arrested after the declaration of martial law, but the movement continued to strike.    
 Although some scholars, such as sociologist Boris Kagarlitsk, claimed that the 
Solidarity movement was  successful primarily due to its charismatic leader, Walesa, the 
movement persisted throughout his imprisonment.123  Since even communication with 
Walesa was limited during his time in prison, the movement still organized a number of 
protests and strikes nationwide.124  This implies that Walesa was an important leader for 
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the movement, but the leadership structure in the opposition network was decentralized 
enough to allow for continuation of the non-violent action during his arrest.  While 
underground, the movement became even more decentralized, because of the prohibition 
of Solidarity, which saw the opposition network work through a much looser structure.  
The movement did this in order to allow for groups that were banned, like Solidarity, to 
operate, but avoid further repression by the government.125  
 The development and consolidation of new organizations into the Solidarity 
umbrella continued throughout all of the 1980s, resulting in an extraordinarily large 
opposition network consisting of over a hundred different groups.  Sociologists Grzegorz 
Ekiert and Jan Kubik provide insight into the level of decentralization of the Solidarity 
movement towards the end of decade by listing the number of different organizations that 
were responsible for sponsoring or leading protests in 1989.  Ekiert and Kubik find that 
out of the 314 total non-violent protest events that took place that year over half of the 
events were led or sponsored by a total of at least 156 different organizations.126  
Although the data was unavailable for over half the events in 1989, the other half were 
led by a mixture of political parties, labor unions, peasant/farmer organizations, interest 
groups, social/political movements, and other miscellaneous organizations.  The total 
number and range of these organizations implies that although they acted under the 
Solidarity movement, that the structure of the network was highly decentralized, but 
coordinated.127   
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4.4 Leadership Structure in the Serbian Transition to Democracy, 1999 – 2000 
 The pro-democracy movement in Serbia towards the end of the twentieth century 
also had a decentralized leadership structure that increased the ability of the movement to 
resist repression and consequently enhanced their potential to achieve a peaceful political 
transition.  As mentioned in Chapter 3, the protests in Serbia in 1996 and 1997 were 
unsuccessful, as they were easily dispersed by the Milosevic regime.  One of the main 
factors that contributed to the failure of these protests was that student groups, political 
opposition institutions, and other pro-democracy organizations remained separate 
throughout their protests, even when rallying against the same issues in the same 
location.128  The complete lack of cooperation among these groups made it easy for the 
Milosevic regime to target the leaders and organizers of each event and either arrest them 
or shut down the protest.  This section investigates the degree of collaboration among 
organizations in the pro-democracy non-violent movement between 1999 and 2000 to 
determine the level of decentralization in the leadership structure of the opposition 
network.   
Diverse Leadership in the Pro-democracy Non-Violent Movement 
 Between June 1999 and October 2000, the opposition movement in Serbia 
assembled numerous events of non-violent action that were designed to place the 
maximum amount of pressure on the Slobodan Milosevic regime.  The major non-violent 
campaigns and events in this movement display a variety of different leaders, from 
different areas of society in Serbia, especially the student, political, and labor sectors.  
After the failures of the earlier protests in 1996 through 1997, the opposition network in 
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Serbia, initiated by the actions of the student group, Otpor!, quickly coordinated and 
organized protest efforts across the country.  In 1998, Otpor! began to organize and 
coordinate other student groups at the University of Belgrade, as a result of increasingly 
restrictive university policies.129 
 In June 1999, Otpor! initiated and led the first major non-violent event against the 
Serbian government, but was not limited to participation by students only, as 
disillusioned voters and other pro-democracy protesters joined in the protest.  Two 
months later, in August 1999, Otpor! held a mock “birthday party” for Milosevic, which 
ridiculed the politics, personality, and possible fate of the Serbian dictator.  Additionally, 
other large non-violent events were held between September and November, highlighted 
by nationwide rock concert rallies that were coordinated and directed by the ANEM 
media network.130  These events indicate that the burgeoning opposition network was 
minimally coordinated, but that the movement as a whole was moving closer to 
developing a united front against the regime, as the bombing of Serbia by NATO forces 
became larger and more frequent, which furthered anti-Milosevic sentiment among the 
Serbian population.  The swell of support from Serbian citizens and organizations like the 
ANEM network and local radio stations, such as Rock Volieb, signified that the 
movement was starting to gain groups and individuals from diverse organizations and 
segments of society and that these new groups were beginning to play a role in the 
movement.131   
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 In early-2000, the Democratic Opposition of Serbia (DOS) was developed, which 
initially consisted of the eighteen major opposition political parties.  The Democratic 
Opposition of Serbia would play a crucial leadership role, alongside Otpor! in a majority 
of the key events leading to the resignation of Milosevic.  Otpor! and DOS each played a 
specific role in the movement, as DOS handled the political aspects of the movement, 
such as providing opposition candidates and holding more formal political rallies, while 
Otpor! organized unique and creative non-violent campaigns and protests, such as 
holding rock concert rallies and using t-shirts and bumper stickers to spread slogans and 
messages.  From April 2000 to late-September 2000, Otpor! and the DOS worked 
together at the forefront of every major campaign and event, excluding the “Face of 
Serbia” campaign, which was predominately organized and executed by only Otpor!.132   
An important aspect of the DOS joining the leadership ranks of the movement 
was that they were able to help increase participation numbers for each event, as the 
political parties were already developed institutionally and also had additional resources 
that helped strengthen the movement.  During this time period, participation numbers for 
the major non-violent campaigns and events averaged between 20,000 and 100,000 
protesters, which not only shows the benefits of adding new leadership to the movement, 
but also helps show how protests became harder to break up, since the protesters greatly 
outnumbered government forces at most events.133  In addition to the leadership provided 
by Otpor! and DOS, workers began to mobilize and strike nationwide, as laborers in 
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multiple industries joined the movement, most notably the miners at the Kolubara 
mines.134  
 What these events display is that at the beginning of the movement, there was not 
much of a well-coordinated opposition network, instead there were loosely affiliated 
organizations protesting the same government and issues.  Throughout the earlier events, 
Otpor! acted as a semi-umbrella organization, that consolidated the efforts of individuals, 
even non-students, into a single more efficient movement.  The introduction of the 
Democratic Opposition of Serbia into the non-violent movement as a large coalition of 
organizations and individuals meant that Otpor! was no longer responsible for the sole 
management of the movement.  The pro-democracy network became further 
decentralized with the inclusion of DOS, since they provided equal leadership in the 
network to Otpor!.  At this point, the opposition network in Serbia consisted of two large 
umbrella institutions that coordinated efforts to help increase the general abilities of the 
movement.  The major non-violent campaigns and events also show that towards the end 
of the movement, greater decentralization in the opposition network occurred with the 
addition of labor unions, which took a strong leadership role, working closely with both 
Otpor! and the DOS.  Between the beginning and the end of the non-violent movement, 
the opposition network increased in size, with the additions of the DOS and the labor 
unions, which also meant that the leadership structure of this group became increasingly 
decentralized.   
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Supplemental Descriptions of the Leadership Structure in Serbia 
 Although the major non-violent campaigns and events provide good insight into 
the structure and interaction of leadership in the opposition network in Serbia, it is also 
necessary to look at supplementary sources to provide additional perspectives into the 
leadership structure.  First, foreign media correspondent Matthew Collin investigates the 
pro-democracy movement in Serbia, starting in the late-1999s, and provides an detailed 
analysis of the coordination between groups in the opposition network, especially Otpor! 
and the Democratic Opposition of Serbia.  Next, this section reviews political scientists 
Ramet and Pavlakovic’s Serbia Since 1989, which describe the methods of leadership in 
the non-violent movement. 
 In The Time of Rebels, Collin details the non-violent movement in Serbia that 
eventually produced a successful political transition, but he also provides first and 
second-hand accounts of the interaction and coordination of the leadership in the 
movement.  Prior to the inclusion of the DOS to the opposition network in early-2000, 
Collin states that Otpor! was the sole leader of the movement, but within the institution, 
there were several different branches and leaders.  Even early in the movement, Otpor! 
democratized most aspects of the organization, such as creating a leadership branch, 
which handled the organization and operation of the events and the development of a 
media campaign branch that was responsible for the printing and spreading of pro-
democracy print materials.135  Once the Democratic Opposition of Serbia joined the 
opposition network, Collin describes that the majority of leadership responsibilities was 
shared between both organizations.  The two institutions collaborated on the organization 
of events, the mobilization of resources and people, and decisions affecting the direction 
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of the movement.  Since the DOS leadership was highly decentralized, as a result of the 
nature of political parties in general, the ability of the two groups to join forces produced 
devolution of leadership in the movement.  In other words, both Otpor! and the 
Democratic Opposition of Serbia were largely decentralized organization prior to their 
alliance, which implies that the leadership in the Serbian opposition network was not only 
spread across the network, but also throughout each organization.136   
 Chapter 3 discussed the role of transnational civil-society institutions in the 
movement.  Although international groups helped lead some of the protests and events, 
and were especially responsible for the general strength of the movement, the leadership 
of the movement remained predominately between Otpor! and the DOS.  In Serbia Since 
1989, Ramet and Pavlakovic describe the interplay of international organizations with the 
leadership of the opposition network.  They explain that the international organizations, 
such as Amnesty International and United States Institute of Peace, provided support to 
the movement, but primarily by attracting international attention to the movement, while 
the domestic opposition network organized the actual non-violent action.137  The 
connection between the leadership structures of international institutions and the 
domestic opposition network also indicates that neither domestic nor international 
organizations were dominant in the movement, signaling a highly decentralized structure 
in the leadership of the movement, as all groups were able to take an active leadership 
role in one way or another.  
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4.5 Conclusion 
 In the non-violent movements in Poland and Serbia, strong opposition networks 
with highly decentralized leadership structures were responsible for the organization and 
coordination of nationwide non-violent action events and campaigns.  The movements in 
Poland and Serbia share numerous similarities regarding the level of decentralization in 
the leadership structure of the opposition network, such as the use of umbrella 
organizations and involvement of international non-governmental organizations.  
Although both networks had some similarities, they also had several differences, such as 
the composition and role of the umbrella organizations, which were not influential 
enough to impact the success of either movement. 
 The Solidarity movement in Poland during the 1980s was responsible for the 
coordination and organization of a sizeable portion the major non-violent campaigns and 
events that contributed to successful political transition.  Although it appeared that 
Solidarity was the principal leader in the movement, because of their leadership in the 
major campaigns and events, the reality was that the opposition network consisted of 
leadership from various institutions and individuals, such as Solidarity, Rural Solidarity, 
and Union of Young Democrats.138  In Poland, the beginning of the Solidarity movement 
had a moderately high level of decentralization in the leadership structure compared to 
the other non-violent movements that Schock studied, which was evident in the 
interconnectivity of the twenty-three organizations in the opposition network in 1981.139  
From 1981 to 1989, the level of decentralization increased in the opposition network as 
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the Solidarity movement inspired the development and collaboration of new institutions 
that eventually grew to include over a hundred different institutions, which took a direct 
role in the leadership of the movement.   
 Similar to the cases that Schock analyzed with umbrella organizations that led the 
movement, such as Bayan in the Phillipines, the Solidarity movement in Poland was able 
to increase their abilities to resist repression.  The decentralization of leadership in the 
opposition network in Poland meant that the Jab!o"ski and Jaruzelski regimes were 
unable to target a single group for repression, which is displayed in the attempt to shut 
down the city blockade in Warsaw by the Jaruzelski regime in 1988 that failed since 
protesters would simply replace removed protesters with new protesters in a continual 
cycle.  Additionally, the decentralized structure in the non-violent movement permitted 
the network to continue to pressure the regime even after the imprisonment of some of its 
leadership, like after the arrest of Walesa in 1982.  Furthermore, the opposition network 
became increasingly more democratic with the consolidation of new groups, which also 
aided in the collaboration of diverse groups, since they were no longer focusing on 
specific objectives, but a common goal. An example of this is the collaboration of two 
groups with contradicting ideologies, like Christian and secular groups, such as the Club 
of Catholic Intelligentsia and the Movement of Polish Socialists’ Accord, respectively.140 
By developing a more democratic network, which worked towards a shared purpose, the 
regime was unable to fracture the movement on ideological divisions.    
 The pro-democracy movement in Serbia also enhanced its resiliency by 
implementing a decentralized leadership network that relied on a diverse group of 
individuals and institutions for the coordination and organization of the major non-violent 
                                                
140 Ibid., pp. 157-165. 
75 
campaigns and events.  The organizers and leaders of events, like the September 27, 2000 
protest in response to the release of election results that were in favor of Milosevic, were 
drawn from an assortment of civil-society institutions, such as the student movement, 
Otpor!, and the Centre for Free Elections and Democracy.  The pro-democracy 
movement in Serbia in 2000 was consolidated predominately into a coalition of a few 
civil-society institutions, such as the Democratic Opposition of Serbia, Otpor!, and the 
Open Society Institute, and international rights advocacy groups, like the International 
Republican Institute.141  Unlike the Solidarity movement in Poland, the opposition 
network in Serbia consisted of fewer civil-society institutions, as the development of new 
organizations was still limited, which led to pro-democracy individuals joining one of the 
more general existing civil-society institutions, instead of participating or creating in a 
more focused organization.  Although there were typically fewer civil-society institutions 
involved in the movement, the leadership responsibilities were divided equally between 
each of these groups, which also decentralized leadership within the structure of each 
organization.  Basically, the leadership of the pro-democracy movement in Serbia was 
decentralized on two levels, in the movement as a whole and throughout each 
organization.   
 The high level of decentralization of the leadership in the pro-democracy 
movement in Serbia meant that the opposition network was able to more effectively resist 
repression efforts by the Milosevic regime.  The decentralized nature of the opposition 
network did not permit the Milosevic regime to efficiently focus repression on a 
particular group, as attempts at targeting the leaders and supporters of Otpor! did not 
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successfully prevent non-violent action from continuing.  Additionally, the imprisonment 
of members of the opposition network, especially some of the prominent members of the 
opposition political parties that were part of the Democratic Opposition of Serbia, had 
minimal impact on the ability of the pro-democracy movement to persist.  This was 
possible since other and new leaders in the opposition political parties and civil-society 
institutions took over the leadership responsibilities of the detained leaders, which 
allowed the movement to continue non-violent action against the regime.   
 The cases of the non-violent movements in Poland and Serbia indicate that 
decentralization of the leadership structures in opposition network can occur in different 
ways, but still enable success.  In Poland, the Solidarity movement consisted of numerous 
civil-society institutions from both the international and domestic realms, working 
closely together for a common objective.  The pro-democracy movement in Serbia 
combined a smaller number of civil-society institutions with a greater number of 
individuals under each of those organizations. The decentralization of the leadership 
structure in the two opposition networks was one of the three factors that helped enable 
success in both of the cases of non-violent action.  This signifies that Schock’s 
hypothesis, which contends that non-violent movements that organize a decentralized 
network of oppositional institutions are more likely to achieve peaceful political 
transition holds true for the cases of Poland and Serbia, but only as one of the three 
necessary, but not sufficient factors that enable success in non-violent action.   
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Chapter 5: Leverage and Resilience in Non-violent Revolutions 
5.1 Chapter Overview 
 The third factor that impacts a non-violent movement’s success is the leverage 
and resilience capabilities of the opposition network, as it relates to the balance of power 
between the movement and the government.  This chapter looks at the leverage and 
resilience capabilities of the non-violent movements in Poland and Serbia and what 
impact they had on the success of the movement.  In both these movements, the leverage 
and resilience abilities of the opposition network helped resist repression efforts by the 
government and pressure the regimes to democratize.  
 After an overview of Schock’s evaluation of the influence of leverage and 
resilience in pro-democracy movements, this chapter examines the role of leverage and 
resilience in the non-violent revolution in Poland from 1980 through 1989.  The 
following section analyzes the pro-democracy movement in Serbia, in terms of its 
leverage and resilience abilities and the consequential impact on the movement’s success.  
These sections explore the location, the non-violent method utilized, the level of 
participation, and the leadership of the major non-violent campaigns and events to 
determine the leverage and resilience capacity of each movement.  The chapter concludes 
with an overview of the impact of the leverage and resilience abilities of the non-violent 
revolutions in Poland and Serbia and whether Schock’s theory, which attributes success 
in non-violent action in part to enhanced leverage and resilience capabilities, holds true 
for the two cases.  The leverage and resilience abilities of a movement are determined by 
numerous factors: the ability of the opposition network to coordinate and hold protests 
and events in a range of locations, because it shows the ability of the movement to 
78 
mobilize support throughout the country; the capability of the movement to utilize an 
array of non-violent methods and techniques, which prevents the government from 
targeting a specific method for repression; the capacity of the opposition network to 
mobilize and coordinate large numbers of protesters at multiple places and events; and 
the diversity of the leadership in the movement, in terms of supporters from different 
organizations sharing leadership duties and responsibilities, which signifies that the 
government is unable to target specific individuals in hope of disrupting the movement.  
5.2 Leverage and Resilience Abilities of Non-violent Movements 
 According to Schock, leverage is the ability of the non-violent movement to 
mobilize or withdrawal support in favor or against the government, while resilience is the 
ability of the non-violent movement to resist continued repression efforts by the 
government.142  Schock contends that the level of decentralization of the opposition 
network, the ability to implement multiple non-violent techniques from across the three 
methods of non-violent action, the ability to implement methods of dispersion as well as 
methods of concentration, and tactical innovation are factors that affect the leverage and 
resilience abilities of a non-violent movement. Schock contends that leverage and 
resilience directly influence the power relationship between the government and the 
opposition network, with the ability to shift power to either party.  Schock’s principal 
assertion is that if a movement has enhanced leverage and resilience capabilities, non-
violent action is more likely to succeed, since the opposition network is capable of 
withdrawing popular support from the regime making it unable to effectively govern.143  
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The next two sections will investigate the extent of leverage and resilience in the non-
violent movements in Poland and Serbia to determine the extent to which Schock’s 
second independent variable contributed to their success. 
5.3 The Impact of the Leverage and Resilience Abilities of the Solidarity Movement in 
Poland 
 The non-violent movement in Poland during the 1980’s was the target for a 
variety of repression efforts by the government that included the imprisonment of 
different leaders, a declaration of martial law, and the prohibition of domestic civil-
society institutions.  In order to survive and prosper in spite of these repression attempts, 
the non-violent movement in Poland implemented a variety of techniques and strategies 
that enhanced its leverage and resilience capabilities.  Starting with an overview of the 
leverage and resilience capacity of the opposition network in Poland prior to 1980, this 
section investigates the major non-violent campaigns and events to determine the ability 
of the movement to implement strategies and techniques to enhance its leverage and 
resilience abilities.  By discovering the degree that the non-violent movement in Poland 
was able to enhance its leverage and resilience capabilities, this section will explore the 
impact of leverage and resilience on the success of the non-violent action. 
Leverage and Resilience Abilities of the Polish Opposition Movement Prior to 1980 
 In December 1970, factory workers in Gdansk, Poland protested a sudden price 
increase in food and other common items, which quickly spread to neighboring cities in 
Northern Poland.  The strikes lasted relatively briefly, but the government responded by 
sending in the government military forces, the Polish People’s Army and the Citizen’s 
Militia, which opened fire on the protesters, killing approximately 40 and wounding 
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thousands.144  Although the strikes turned violent and civilians were killed, multiple 
Polish officials were forced to resign in order to prevent a nationwide outbreak of riots 
and protests. Edward Gierek replaced W!adys!aw Gomu!ka as the Polish United Workers' 
Party leader, which resulted in a reversal of policies by the Polish government that 
included lowering meat prices, raising worker wages, and more changes were 
promised.145  The workers who protested the raising of meat prices and wage decreases 
mainly held their strikes in only a few areas, limited to Northern Poland, and did not 
implement a variety of non-violent methods.  The leadership of the protests was 
decentralized, but only as a result of mass disorganization on the part of the strikers, 
which allowed for the Polish government to eliminate the leaders in an attempt to stop the 
movement.  Although the government was successful in destroying the already 
disorganized leadership of the protesters and halting the strikes, the protesters were 
successful in temporary improving their situation.  The protesters leverage and resilience 
abilities were severely limited and the political change that was produced was shallow in 
the sense that the results only improved the conditions in Poland for a short time period. 
 Six years later, in June 1976, the economy in Poland was in a more dire situation 
than it was in December 1970, resulting in the announcement that the prices of all basic 
food items would be raised a considerable amount, since the prices were frozen after the 
1970 strikes.  The announcement by Prime Minister Piotr Jaroszewicz resulted in 
nationwide outrage that led to strikes, looting, and violence across different cities in 
Poland.  Strikes were largely concentrated in Radom, Ursus, and Plock, but also took 
place in Warsaw, Poznan, and Gdansk.  An estimated 75,000 protesters in approximately 
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100 factories across Poland took place in the June 1976 strikes, which resulted in shallow 
political change similar to the aftermath of the 1970 strikes.146  Although the protesters 
were able to mobilize a relatively large number of strikers in a short amount of time, the 
opposition movement still had limited leverage and resilience capabilities, as a result of 
the protests turning violent that ultimately resulted in a loss of credibility and support for 
the movement.  Throughout the rest of the 1970’s, the opposition movement continued to 
build support structures, coalitions, and civil society institutions, while the Polish 
government was content to simply avoid confrontations with the workers.   
Employment of Methods of Dispersion and Concentration by the Solidarity Movement 
 In 1980, the pro-democracy movement in Poland implemented widespread non-
violent action in response to another increase in food prices and a decrease in worker 
wages.  The opposition movement organized and coordinated hundreds of thousands of 
pro-democracy protesters at different events in cities all over Poland, especially in 
Gdansk, Warsaw, and Lublin.147  Between July 1980 and December 1981, five major 
non-violent events and campaigns took place nationwide, with participation ranging from 
1,000 in the earlier strikes in the smaller cities to seven million during the third and most 
successful Free Saturday strike on January 24, 1981.148  Even after the imposition of 
martial law on December 31, 1981, which prohibited independent trade unions until 
1985, the pro-democracy movement organized multiple strikes, protests, and other non-
violent action nationwide.  From 1985 until 1989, the Solidarity movement frequently 
organized numerous major non-violent campaign and events nationwide, with 
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approximately 100 to 60,000 participants per event per city.149  Although the protests 
were focused in Warsaw, the movement also mobilized large numbers of strikers, 
protesters, and organizations to employ non-violent action in other Polish cities, such as 
Gdansk, Szczecin, and Krakow. 
The Implementation of a Range of Actions Across the Three Methods of Non-violent 
Action 
 Between 1980 and 1989, the pro-democracy movement in Poland employed non-
violent action across all three methods of non-violent action, which are protest and 
persuasion, noncooperation, and disruptive non-violent intervention.  Between July 1980 
and August 1981, the opposition movement implemented non-violent methods mostly in 
the protest and persuasion and noncooperation categories.  Labor strikes, social 
disobedience, speeches, petitions, journals, newspapers, picketing, prayer, singing, 
marches, and refusal of public support for the government were just some of the non-
violent methods utilized during this time.150  From 1981 through 1989, the Solidarity 
movement employed non-violent action evenly from all three methods.  In addition to the 
methods listed above, the pro-democracy movement utilized marches, election boycotts, 
economic boycotts, sit-ins, hunger strikes, blockades, and civil disobedience against the 
Jab!o"ski and Jaruzelski regimes. 
                                                
149 Garton Ash, Timothy . The Polish Revolution: Solidarity . 3 ed. New Haven: Yale University Press, 
2002. pp. 142-144. and Francisco, Ron. "Poland 80-81." European Protest and Coercion Data. Kansas 
University. <web.ku.edu/~ronfran/data/Poland80-81.xls>. 
150 Francisco, Ron. "Poland 80-81." European Protest and Coercion Data. Kansas University. 
<web.ku.edu/~ronfran/data/Poland80-81.xls>. 
83 
Decentralized Leadership and the Ability to Innovate Tactically 
 As discussed in Chapter 4, the pro-democracy movement’s leadership structure 
became increasingly decentralized throughout the 1980’s, resulting in a highly 
decentralized, yet organized leadership structure. The level of decentralization of the 
Solidarity movement towards the end of decade is displayed through the number of 
different organizations that were responsible for sponsoring or leading protests between 
1980 and 1989.  For example, in 1989, 314 total non-violent protest events took place 
that year and over half of the events were led or sponsored by a total of at least 156 
different organizations.151 The leadership of the movement was divided among numerous 
political parties, labor unions, peasant/farmer organizations, interest groups, 
social/political movements, and other miscellaneous organizations.  Additionally, the pro-
democracy’s decentralized leadership structure was able to strategically adjust their 
practices to stay a step ahead of the government.  The Solidarity movement continually 
innovated their protest tactics and techniques, such as utilizing civil-society institutions, 
like the Charitable Commission of the Episcopate (KCEP), to receive equipment and 
supplies without the government’s knowledge or inspection.152   
Persisting in the Face of Repression to Achieve Peaceful Political Transition 
 The opposition faced a variety of different challenges from the government in its 
quest for a peaceful political transition.  The government’s repression tactics included a 
special paramilitary task force, anti-assembly legislation, a declaration of martial law, and 
the official military and police forces tasked with suppressing any opposition campaigns 
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or protests.  In addition to multiple arrests, attempted assassinations, and mass factory 
firings, the government attempted to ban the development and operation of all 
independent trade unions.153  Through tactical innovation and a decentralized leadership 
structure, the pro-democracy movement in Poland was able to overcome numerous 
obstacles, including multiple years spent underground.  Furthermore, by resisting 
repression attempts by the government, the pro-democracy movement in Poland gained 
support by exploiting the government’s abuse through the independent and international 
media.  
Conclusion 
 The ability of the pro-democracy movement to employ methods of dispersion and 
concentration, implement a range of actions across the three methods of non-violent 
action, share leadership responsibilities, tactically innovate and persist in the face of 
repression indicates the Solidarity movement’s leverage and resilience capabilities.  Since 
the pro-democracy movement had advanced leverage and resilience abilities, it was able 
to overcome and overwhelm the government through non-violent action.  The opposition 
movement’s leverage and resilience capacity meant that the government was unable to 
target a specific group, location, action, or method, which meant that the government 
could not respond accordingly to the non-violent action.  The leverage and resilience 
capabilities of the pro-democracy movement directly contributed to the success of the 
non-violent action in Poland.  
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5.4 The Role of Leverage and Resilience in the Pro-democracy Movement in Serbia 
 The pro-democracy movement in Serbia was met with a great deal of government 
resistance, as the Milosevic regime utilized police and military forces, restrictive 
legislation, and assassinations in attempts to repress the burgeoning movement.  The pro-
democracy movement employed an assortment of methods and strategies that boosted its 
leverage and resilience capacity, in order to succeed in the face of the government’s 
repression efforts. The next section provides an overview of the leverage and resilience 
capabilities of the opposition network in Serbia before 1999.  The following section 
investigates the major non-violent campaigns and events to determine the ability of the 
movement to use methods of dispersion and concentration, non-violent action from all of 
the three methods of non-violent action, a decentralized leadership structure, and to 
tactically innovate in order to enhance the opposition network’s leverage and resilience 
abilities.  By determining the ability of the non-violent movement in Serbia to improve its 
leverage and resilience capabilities, this section will examine the contribution of leverage 
and resilience on the success of the non-violent action. 
Leverage and Resilience Abilities of the Serbian Opposition Movement Prior to 1999 
 Following the 1996 local elections in Serbia, the Zajedno coalition and university 
students took to the streets claiming that the results of the election were fraudulent.  
Although the protests achieved minor success through the official acceptance of the 
election victories of the opposition parties, the coalition’s leadership was severely 
fractured, which resulted in the dissolution of the group and any further protests at that 
time.  Additionally, the university students and the Zajedno coalition held all protests and 
non-violent action separately, which meant that it was easier for the government to 
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disperse, since the events were divided in participation numbers and generally less 
organized.154  Prior to the beginning of the 1999 protests, the pro-democracy movement’s 
leverage and resilience abilities were nominal, as a result of the disbanding of the 
Zajedno coalition and the lack of organization and leadership among the university 
students.155  This meant that the pro-democracy movement in Serbia was unable to 
implement methods of dispersion and concentration and tactically innovate, as the action 
and mobilization orders often conflicted with one another, as they were from a variety of 
sources.     
Employment of Methods of Dispersion and Concentration by the Pro-Democracy 
Movement 
 After the institution of new hiring policies for the universities that required 
government approval of all professor appointments in late-1998, Otpor! and other student 
groups formed and began to communicate with other newly developing domestic civil-
society institutions.  In mid-1999, the first few major non-violent campaigns and events 
were primarily concentrated in Serbian cities with large student populations, such as Nis 
and Belgrade, with approximately one-thousand participants per event.  In September 
1999, after a downturn in the economy, protests erupted in over twenty cities with 
upwards of 15,000 participating in each city, which were primarily sponsored and led by 
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Otpor! and the different opposition political parties that would eventually form the 
Democratic Opposition of Serbia.156   
 Between October 1999 and September 2000, most of the major non-violent 
campaigns and events were held in or around Belgrade, with participation numbers 
ranging from 1,000 to 100,000 at each event.  Although the protests primarily took place 
in Belgrade, the pro-democracy movement managed to continually mobilize supporters in 
a variety of locations in Belgrade simultaneously.  During the last week of the protests, 
between September 27 and October 5, DOS, Otpor!, and several other domestic and 
international non-governmental organizations coordinated protests, strikes, and other 
forms of non-violent across all major cities in Serbia.  Approximately 10,000 to 100,000 
people attended each event, with the total rising to 500,000 on October 5, 2000, when the 
pro-democracy movement implemented waves of general strikes, sit-ins, and marches, 
which resulted in a complete shutdown of official operations, including official police 
and military forces.  The varying locations and high participation numbers display the 
ability of the pro-democracy movement in Serbia to employ methods of dispersion and 
concentration.157  
The Implementation of a Range of Actions Across the Three Methods of Non-violent 
Action 
 The pro-democracy movement in Serbia organized and led a variety of creative 
non-violent campaigns and events that contributed to the peaceful ousting of President 
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Slobodan Milosevic.  Otpor! developed innovative and interesting non-violent campaigns 
and event that not only gained the media and the public’s attention, but also the attention 
of the government.  The pro-democracy movement utilized unique events, such as a 
mock birthday party for Milosevic that included gifts designed for his inevitable 
incarceration and rock concert rallies and tours that helped spread the pro-democracy 
message to the Serbian youth.158  Additionally, Otpor! used new technology and diverse 
mediums, such as websites, email, t-shirts, stickers, posters, and banners to circulate 
announcements, messages, slogans, and plans.  In addition to the more unique non-
violent methods utilized, the pro-democracy movement in Serbia also used traditional 
non-violent action, such as rallies, marches, protests, demonstrations, strikes, and sit-
ins.159 Throughout the non-violent campaign against the Milosevic regime, the pro-
democracy movement in Serbia implemented non-violent action from the protest and 
persuasion, noncooperation, and disruptive and creative non-violent intervention 
classifications of non-violent methods.  Since the pro-democracy movement in Serbia 
used both new and traditional non-violent methods, the government was unable to target 
a particular method or event to focus its repression efforts on.    
Decentralized Leadership and the Ability to Innovate Tactically 
 The pro-democracy movement in Serbia enhanced its resiliency by implementing 
a decentralized leadership network that relied on a diverse group of individuals and 
institutions for the coordination and organization of the major non-violent campaigns and 
events.  The organizers and leaders of events, like the September 27, 2000, protest in 
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response to the release of election results that were in favor of Milosevic, were drawn 
from an assortment of civil-society institutions, such as the student movement, Otpor!, 
and the Centre for Free Elections and Democracy.  The pro-democracy movement in 
Serbia was consolidated predominately into a coalition of a few civil-society institutions, 
such as the Democratic Opposition of Serbia, Otpor!, and the Open Society Institute, and 
international rights advocacy groups, like the International Republican Institute.160  
Although there were typically less civil-society institutions involved in the movement, 
the leadership responsibilities were divided equally between each of these groups, which 
also decentralized leadership within the structure of each organization.  The decentralized 
nature of the opposition network did not permit the Milosevic regime to efficiently focus 
repression on a particular group, as attempts at targeting the leaders and supporters of 
Otpor! did not successfully prevent non-violent action from continuing.  Additionally, the 
imprisonment of members of the opposition network, especially some of the prominent 
members of the opposition political parties that were part of the Democratic Opposition 
of Serbia, had minimal impact on the ability of the pro-democracy movement to 
persist.161  This was possible since other and new leaders in the opposition political 
parties and civil-society institutions took over the leadership responsibilities of the 
detained leaders, which allowed the movement to continue non-violent action against the 
regime.   
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Persisting in the Face of Repression to Achieve Peaceful Political Transition 
 The opposition movement in Serbia faced multiple obstacles from the Milosevic 
regime that it needed to overcome to achieve a peaceful political transition.  The Serbian 
government utilized several repression methods and policies to control the non-violent 
action, including imprisonment, blackmail, harassment, and restrictive curfew and 
assembly laws.  In addition to multiple arrests, attempted assassinations, and mass 
university expulsions, the government attempted to ban the organization of new domestic 
civil-society institutions.162  Through tactical innovation and a decentralized leadership 
structure, the pro-democracy movement in Serbia was able to succeed in the face of 
repression.  Furthermore, by resisting repression attempts by the government, the pro-
democracy movement gained support by exploiting the government’s cruelty through 
international media and organizations.   
Conclusion 
 The ability of the pro-democracy movement to implement methods of dispersion 
and concentration, utilize a range of actions across the three methods of non-violent 
action, lead cooperatively, tactically innovate and persist in the face of repression 
displays that the pro-democracy movement in Serbia had enhanced leverage and 
resilience capabilities.  Since the pro-democracy movement had an advanced leverage 
and resilience capacity, it was able to overcome and overwhelm the Milosevic regime 
through non-violent action.  The opposition movement’s leverage and resilience 
capabilities signified that the regime was unable to target a specific organization, 
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location, event, or technique, which meant that the government could not respond 
accordingly to the non-violent action.  The leverage and resilience capabilities of the pro-
democracy movement directly contributed to the success of the non-violent action. 
5.5 Conclusion 
 The pro-democracy movements in Poland and Serbia both improved their 
leverage and resilience abilities, which directly contributed to the movements’ success.  
The non-violent movements in Poland and Serbia strengthened their leverage and 
resilience capabilities by implementing methods of dispersion and concentration, 
employing methods from all the three categories of non-violent action, decentralizing 
leadership, tactically innovating, and by mobilizing and/or withdrawing support for the 
government.  The enhanced leverage and resilience capacity of the non-violent 
movements in Poland and Serbia aided the ability of the opposition networks to avoid 
and/or overcome government repression efforts.  The governments were unable to 
effectively target military and police forces, policies, and other repression efforts on a 
specific event, location, organization, or non-violent method.  Since the non-violent 
movements in Poland and Serbia avoided direct pressure from the governments, the 
opposition networks in both countries grew larger and more powerful.  The Solidarity 
movement in Poland and the pro-democracy movement in Serbia used anti-government 
sentiment due to other social and economic factors, especially from the price increase on 
food in Poland and the NATO bombing of Serbia, to gain momentum and greater support 
from citizens and international and domestic non-governmental organizations. The 
growing anti-government sentiment in Serbia contributed to halting the governments’ 
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operation because the citizens were becoming less obedient to the regimes, signifying 
that the governments no longer had enough support to enforce their policies.163    
 The cases of the non-violent movements in Poland and Serbia demonstrate that 
enhanced leverage and resilience ability enable success in non-violent revolutions.  In 
Poland, the Solidarity movement held campaigns and events in a variety of locations, 
utilized diverse non-violent methods, especially factory sit-ins and the Free Saturday 
strikes that brought the entire country to a standstill.  Additionally, the pro-democracy 
movement in Poland shared logistical and planning responsibilities in order to prevent the 
government from successfully targeting an individual or an organization and used its 
power to mobilize or withdraw support from the government by eliminating the 
obedience of the citizens that the government relied on.  Similarly, the pro-democracy 
movement in Serbia organized nationwide campaign and events, used unique and creative 
non-violent techniques, decentralized leadership, and capitalized on current events, like 
the NATO bombing of Serbia and the economic crisis, to place overpowering political 
pressure on the Milosevic regime. The enhanced leverage and resilience capacity of the 
opposition networks was one of the three factors that helped enable success in both of the 
cases of non-violent action, which means that Schock’s hypothesis holds true for this 
factor in the cases of Poland and Serbia.  
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Chapter 6: Conclusion 
6.1 Findings 
 This thesis examined the non-violent revolutions in Poland in 1989 and Serbia in 
2000 in context of the three factors that political scientist Kurt Schock hypothesized as 
enabling success in non-violent action: links between domestic and international civil-
society institutions and the opposition network, decentralized leadership in the opposition 
network, and enhanced leverage and resilience capabilities.  To determine whether or not 
these factors aided the success of the non-violent revolutions in Poland and Serbia, this 
study investigated factors including the role of non-governmental organizations in the 
pro-democracy movements, leadership of the major non-violent campaigns and events, 
and the ability of the opposition network to enhance its leverage and resilience capacity 
through tactical innovation, avoiding repression, and utilizing diverse non-violent 
methods.  
 In the cases of the non-violent revolutions in Poland and Serbia, domestic and 
international civil-society institutions provided valuable financial support, international 
media attention, and additional participants to the pro-democracy movements.  In Poland, 
domestic organizations like Solidarity, the Charitable Commission of the Episcopate 
(KCEP), and the Workers' Defense Committee (KOR), along with transnational non-
governmental organizations, such as the National Endowment for Democracy (NED), the 
Polish-American Congress (PAC), and Pomost, contributed money, technology, and 
other resources that strengthened the operational abilities of the opposition network.164  
Similarly, in Serbia, domestic civil-society institutions, such as Otpor!, the Open Society 
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Institute and Center for Free Elections and Democracy (CESID), in addition to 
international NGOs like Amnesty International, Freedom House, and the International 
Republican Institute (IRI), provided training, financial and material resources, and real-
time reports of the non-violent action and the Milosevic regime’s responses.  The support 
provided by domestic and international civil-society institutions enabled the non-violent 
movements in Poland and Serbia to hold major non-violent campaigns and events that 
helped pressure the governments.  
 The pro-democracy movements in Poland and Serbia shared logistical and 
planning responsibilities among a variety of individuals, organizations, and coalitions, 
which made it more difficult for the government to target a specific person or group for 
banishment, imprisonment, or even assassination.  The non-violent movement in Poland 
utilized a decentralized leadership structure in the form of an umbrella organization, 
Solidarity, which acted as the primary coordinator for several autonomous domestic and 
international organizations.  The Serbian non-violent movement also used decentralized 
leadership, but in the form of a few civil-society institutions, such as Otpor! and the 
Democratic Opposition of Serbia (DOS).165  The non-violent movements’ decentralized 
leadership structures helped the opposition networks avoid government repression efforts, 
as the governments were unable to target specific individuals or organizations.  When 
leaders such as Lech Walesa were imprisoned, or groups such as Solidarity prohibited, 
the non-violent movements persisted underground due to financial and material 
assistance provided by international organizations, such as Pomost.  The ability of the 
pro-democracy movements in Poland and Serbia to continue normal operations by 
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persisting through the imprisonment, blacklisting, and/or assassination of their leaders 
signifies that the use of decentralized leadership structure of the movements contributed 
to the success of the non-violent action.   
 The opposition networks in Poland and Serbia actively enhanced their leverage 
and resilience abilities by employing methods of dispersion and concentration, 
implementing non-violent action from each of the three categorizations of non-violent 
methods, using decentralized leadership, and persisting in the face of repression.  The 
Solidarity movement coordinated major campaigns and events throughout Poland, 
implemented a wide range of non-violent methods and strategies, decentralized 
leadership, and overcame repression by the Jab!o"ski and Jaruzelski regimes.  In Serbia, 
the pro-democracy movement held non-violent action in cities across Serbia, employed 
creative and unique forms of non-violent action, decentralized leadership, and continued 
to pressure the Milosevic regime, even after numerous imprisonments and assassinations.  
These steps taken by the Polish and Serbian opposition networks enhanced their leverage 
and resilience abilities, which made it difficult for the governments to respond 
accordingly.  The enhanced leverage and resilience capabilities of the pro-democracy 
movements in Poland and Serbia provided the opposition networks with the strength to 
increase pressure on the government, bringing government operations, including 
economic institutions and legislative bodies, to a standstill.  
 Schock’s three factors, a link between civil-society institutions and the 
challengers, a decentralized leadership structure, and leverage and resilience abilities, 
each played an important role in enabling success in non-violent movements.  Schock’s 
first two factors, a link between civil-society institutions and the challengers and a 
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decentralized leadership structure, are the two largest contributing factors in terms of the 
non-violent movements enhancing their leverage and resilience.  Additionally, each of 
the factors were necessary to enable success in non-violent action, but not sufficient to 
enable success independently.  Furthermore, Schock’s first factor, a link between civil-
society institutions and the challengers in a non-violent movement was directly connected 
to Schock’s second factor, a decentralized leadership structure, because the addition of 
domestic and international non-governmental organizations to the non-violent 
movements aided the decentralization of the opposition networks in Poland and Serbia, as 
detailed in Chapter 4.  In addition to the connection between Schock’s first and second 
factors, the second factor, a decentralized leadership structure is directly connected to 
Schock’s third factor, leverage and resilience, because decentralized leadership structures 
enhanced the leverage and resilience capabilities of the non-violent movements in Poland 
and Serbia.  The use of decentralized leadership structures in Poland and Serbia signifies 
that the governments were unable to target a specific individual or organization, which 
also meant that the opposition networks were able to continue normal operations when 
leaders were imprisoned or assassinated.  Schock’s third factor, leverage and resilience, 
seemed to have the greatest impact comparatively, as Schock’s first and second factors 
helped improve the leverage and resilience abilities of the non-violent movements in 
Poland and Serbia.  
 This thesis concludes that in the cases of the non-violent movements in Poland in 
1989 and Serbia in 2000 that a link between civil-society institutions and the challengers, 
a decentralized leadership structure, and enhanced leverage and resilience capabilities 
enabled success for the non-violent action.  The pro-democracy movements utilized these 
97 
factors to overpower the governments’ military and police forces, restrictive policies, and 
resources to produce political transition.  Although the non-violent movements in Poland 
and Serbia capitalized on the political, economic, and social crises that were plaguing 
both countries, the main impact of these factors was that they increased participation and 
support for the pro-democracy movements.  Schock’s hypothesis that a link between 
civil-society institutions and the challengers, a decentralized leadership structure, and 
enhanced leverage and resilience abilities enables success in non-violent action proves 
true for the cases of the non-violent revolutions in Poland and Serbia.  
6.2 Limitations   
 Schock’s three factors that were examined in this research, in context of the non-
violent movements in Poland and Serbia, are considered necessary, but not sufficient 
factors in enabling success in non-violent action.  This signifies that links between civil-
society institutions and challengers in a non-violent movement, decentralized leadership 
structures, and resilience and leverage were not influential enough to enable success 
individually, but their presence was required as a whole for non-violent action to succeed.  
In other words, this thesis discovered that Schock’s three factors were necessary, but not 
sufficient causes only in the cases of the non-violent movements in Poland and Serbia, 
which means that this research is unable to prove if any of the three factors are adequate 
to enable success on their own for all cases.  Findings in this research and Schock’s 
Unarmed Insurrections can only indicate that in non-violent action, a link between civil-
society institutions and the challengers, a decentralized leadership structure, and 
enhanced leverage and resilience abilities are more likely to be found in cases of 
successful non-violent action.  These two cases, combined with Schock’s six cases 
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display that assistance from external factors and political opportunities is also beneficial 
in enabling success, but it is difficult to assess to what extent it plays a role.   
 The main limitation of this study is that it only tested a small number (n) of cases, 
as a means of providing insight and supplying further hypotheses for testing, as opposed 
to proving or disproving a certain theory.  Due to time and resource limits, this study 
investigated two successful cases of non-violent action, instead of a multitude of cases 
involving successes and failures.  This small-n study does not attempt to prove Schock’s 
hypothesis true for all cases of non-violent action, but that they were present and/or 
influential in the cases of Poland and Serbia, which can add to the six cases that Schock 
tested in his research.  Two successful cases of non-violent action were chosen since this 
research is designed to explore whether Schock’s factors, if present, enable success, as 
opposed to determining whether they also cause failure when absent.  This signifies that 
this research is unable to prove whether these factors are necessary for success in all 
cases of non-violent action.  This research hopes that other contemporary and historical 
cases of non-violent action, both successful and unsuccessful, will be analyzed in terms 
of Schock’s hypothesis.  Further research is necessary to provide a definitive answer to 
whether Schock’s hypothesis proves true for all cases of non-violent action, which could 
provide an important framework for enabling success in non-violent movements.   
6.3 Implications for future research 
 In addition to providing insight into whether Schock’s hypothesis proves true in 
the cases of the non-violent action in Poland and Serbia, this thesis was also designed to 
help suggest further hypotheses for testing.  While researching for this thesis, I 
discovered an intriguing aspect of non-violent opposition networks, which fits with 
99 
Schock’s first factor, a link between civil-society institutions and the challengers.  I 
discovered that several non-violent opposition organizations have aided other non-violent 
organizations in different countries, providing resources, literature, and hands-on non-
violent training.  The intriguing aspect of this discovery is that non-violent opposition 
networks appear to act similarly to global terrorist networks, but with different motives, 
as terrorist groups provide training and materials for financial benefit, whereas non-
violent groups like Otpor! are primarily interested in eliminating authoritarian regimes.  
For example, the Irish Republican Army (IRA) has been involved in providing material 
resources and training to the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC),166 while 
non-violent groups like Otpor! (now CANVAS) have provided training and resources to 
other international pro-democracy movements, such as the anti-Chavez movement in 
Venezuela in 2002.167  This thesis suggests that further research could test the 
contribution of experienced non-violent institutions and leadership to new non-violent 
movements.   
Another interesting aspect of the non-violent action in Poland and Serbia was the 
difference in the average age of the movement and the types of non-violent methods 
utilized by each group.   The Solidarity movement was primarily comprised of middle-
aged working-class people and employed more traditional methods of non-violent action, 
such as strikes and sit-ins, while the pro-democracy movement in Serbia, which was 
primarily youth-based, used creative methods of non-violent action and technology more 
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frequently.  This thesis suggests that further research could also test whether the age of 
the movement influences the types of non-violent methods used by that group.   
6.4 Conclusion 
 According to Schock, “we need an accurate understanding of what non-violent 
action is, and we need social scientific analyses of non-violent action that neither 
romanticize it, on the one hand, nor dismiss its power and potential, on the other.”168  
Schock’s three factors; a link between civil-society institutions and the challengers, 
decentralized leadership, and enhanced leverage and resilience abilities enabled success 
for the non-violent revolutions in Poland and Serbia.  Although it is still only a 
beginning, this research could be used as part of a more comprehensive study that could 
discover a definitive answer on the impact of Schock’s three factors on enabling success 
in non-violent action.   
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
168 Schock, Kurt. Unarmed Insurrections: People Power Movements In Nondemocracies. Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press, 2004. p. 171.!
101 
References 
"A Force More Powerful." A Force More Powerful. 
 <http://www.aforcemorepowerful.org/films/bdd/story/chronology.php>  
Alm, Leslie R. "Is Spotlighting Enough? Environmental NGOs and the Commision for 
 Environmental Cooperation. " Canadian - American Public Policy  67 (2006): 1-
 46. ProQuest Military Collection, ProQuest. Web.  9 Apr. 2010. 
BBC "Timeline of an uprising." BBC NEWS | News Front Page. 
 <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/959077.stm>. 
Bernstein, Carl. "The Holy Alliance: Ronald Reagan and John Paul II - TIME." 
 Time.com.  24 Feb. 1992. 
 <http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,974931,00.html>. 
Billet, Bret Lee. Investment Behavior of Multinational Corporations in Developing 
 Areas: Comparing the Development Assistance Committee, Japanese, and 
 American Corporations. New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 1991. p. 31 
Bratton, Michael, and Nicholas Van De Walle. Democratic Experiments in Africa: 
 Regime Transitions in Comparative Perspective (Cambridge Studies in 
 Comparative Politics). New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997.  
Collin, Matthew. The Time of the Rebels: Youth Resistance Movements and 21st Century 
 Revolutions. New York: Serpent's Tail, 2009.  
Eisinger, Peter K.. "The Conditions of Protest Behavior in American Cities." American 
 Political Science Review 67 (1973): pp. 11-28. 
102 
Ekiert, Grzegorz, and Jan Kubik. Rebellious Civil Society: Popular Protest and 
 Democratic Consolidation in Poland, 1989-1993. Ann Arbor: University of 
 Michigan Press, 2001.  
Francisco, Ron. "Poland 80-81." European Protest and Coercion Data. Kansas 
 University. <web.ku.edu/~ronfran/data/Poland80-81.xls>. 
Garton Ash, Timothy . The Polish Revolution: Solidarity . 3 ed. New Haven: Yale 
 University Press, 2002. pp. 142-144.  
Goodwyn, Lawrence. Breaking the Barrier: The Rise of Solidarity in Poland. New York: 
 Oxford University Press,, 1991. pp. 157-160. 
Historic Documents of 2000. Volume 29. Washington, D.C: CQ Press, 2001. p. 834 
Kagarlitsky, Boris. The Dialectic of Change. London: Verso Books, 1990. pp 187, 202.  
Keck, Margaret E, and Sikkink, Kathryn. Activists Beyond Borders. Ithaca: Cornell 
 University Press, 1998. pp. 1-38. 
Keck, Margaret E. "Social Equity and Environmental Politics in Brazil: Lessons from the 
 Rubber Tappers of Acre," Comparative Politics 27 (July 1995): pp. 409-24. 
Keeler, John. "Opening the Window for Reform: Mandates,." Comparative Political 
 Studies 25.4 (1993): 433-486. Comparative Political Studies. Web. 7 Dec. 2009. 
Kidder, Rushworth. "US helping hand extends to Poles," Christian Science Monitor 
 (Dec. 31, 1981). p. 14. 
Labedz, Leopold. Poland under Jaruzelski: A Comprehensive Sourcebook on Poland 
 During and After M. New York: Scribner, 1984. pp. 150-151.  
Lazi$, Mladen. Protest in Belgrade: Winter of Discontent. Budapest: Central European 
 University Press, 1999. pp. 78-99.  
103 
Lopata, Helena Znaniecka. Polish Americans: Status Competition in an Ethnic 
 Community. 2 ed. London: Transaction Publishers, 1976. pp. 226-228. 
Machiavelli, Niccolo. The Prince (Oxford World's Classics). New Ed ed. New York: 
 Oxford University Press, USA, 2005. p. 56. 
McAdam, Douglas . "Conceptual origins, current problems, future directions." Douglas 
 McAdam, John D. McCarthy, Mayer Y. Zald, Eds. Comparative Perspectives on 
 Social Movements: Political Opportunities, Mobilizing Structures, and cultural 
 framings. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999. p. 28. 
Meyer, David S.. "Protest and Political Opportunities." Annual Review of Sociology 30 
 (2004): ProQuest, <http://proquest.umi.com.authenticate.library.duq.edu/ 
 pqdweb?index=1&did=691458451&SrchMode=2&sid=1&Fmt=4&VInst=PROD
 &VType=PQD&RQT=309&VName=PQD&TS=1283813701&clientId=3262>. 
 p. 125. 
O'Donnell, Guillermo, Philippe C. Schmitter, and Laurence Whitehead. Transitions from 
 Authoritarian Rule: Comparative Perspectives. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins 
 University Press, 1986.  
Open Government: Fostering Dialogue with Civil Society. Paris: Oecd, 2003. p. 191.  
Osa, Maryjane. Solidarity and Contention: Networks of Polish Opposition. Minneapolis: 
 University of Minnesota Press, 2003.  
"OTPOR." OTPOR. <http://otpor.com> and "Serbian Case." Canvas. 
 <http://www.canvasopedia.org/>  
"Polish Union Lifts Warsaw Blockade." Ellensburg Daily Record. 5 Aug. 1981: 18. 
 Google News. 
104 
 <http://news.google.com/newspapers?nid=860&dat=19810805&id=rywQAAAAI
 BAJ&sjid=CY8DAAAAIBAJ&pg=5304,2604914>.  
Ramet, Sabrina P. and Vjeran Pavlakovic, Eds. Serbia Since 1989: Politics And Society 
 Under Milosevic And After (Jackson School Publications in International 
 Studies). New Edition. Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2005.  
Reuters. "AROUND THE WORLD; Solidarity Leaders Seek Boycott by Polish Voters." 
 New York Times. 19 July 1985: World. 
 <http://www.nytimes.com/1985/07/19/world/around-the-world-solidarity-leaders-
 seek-boycott-by-polish-voters.html>.  
Roxburgh , Angus. "BBC NEWS | In Depth | Pope's role in Communism's end." BBC 
 News. 2 Apr. 2005. <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/3007787.stm>. 
Schock, Kurt. Unarmed Insurrections: People Power Movements In Nondemocracies. 
 Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2004.  
Sharp, Gene. Power and Struggle (Politics of Nonviolent Action, Part 1). Boston: Porter 
 Sargent Publishers, 1973. p. 65.  
Sharp, Gene. The Methods of Nonviolent Action (Politics of Nonviolent Action, Part 2). 
 Boston: Porter Sargent Publishers, 1973. p. 110. 
Stefoff, Rebecca. Lech Walesa: The Road to Democracy. 1st ed. Chicago: Ballantine 
 Books, 1992.  
United States. Cong. Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations and the Subcommittee on 
 European Affairs. The future of Europe. Hearing. December 13, 1989, January 17, 
 February 1 and 22, March 1, 7, 21, 22, 28, and 29, May 9, and June 12, 1990. 
 101st Cong., 2nd sess. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1991. 
105 
 <http://books.google.com/books?id=wEL8CUPNhrwC&q=%22Polish+Legal+De
 fense+Fund%22&dq=%22Polish+Legal+Defense+Fund%22&hl=en&ei=z1b4S_z
 tN4e8lQezmoy_CA&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=2&ved=0CDUQ
 6AEwAQ> 
 
  
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
106 
Appendix 1: Organizations involved in the non-violent movement in Poland, 1980-
1989 
 
Organization Acronym Type 
(International 
or Domestic) 
Actions 
Solidarity SOL Domestic 
(Poland) 
Responsible for the coordination and organization of the 
opposition, as most opposition groups cooperated with 
them.  They were responsible for the leadership, as a 
collective entity, for the domestic leadership of most of the 
major sit-ins, strikes, demonstrations, and blockades.  Also 
responsible for the management of all funds received from 
domestic and international donors that was used for a 
variety of purposes, from printing resources to medical aid.  
Rural 
Solidarity 
SRI Domestic 
(Poland) 
Organized and led strikes and sit-ins by the Polish farmers, 
also worked with Solidarity to publish pro-democracy 
papers and posters to spread information.   
Group against 
Job 
Discrimination 
GAB Domestic 
(Poland) 
Under Solidarity's umbrella, worked to protect Polish 
citizens against being discriminated for jobs if they were 
not sympathizers of the Polish regime.  
Movement of 
Free 
Democrats 
RWD Domestic 
(Poland) 
Under Solidarity's umbrella, held Poland government 
accountable for policies agreed upon in Helsinki Accords, 
reported and organized protests for this cause.  
Independent 
Self-
Governing 
Union of 
Teachers and 
Educational 
Employees 
ZNP Domestic 
(Poland) 
Under Solidarity's umbrella, Teacher's group that formed 
to protect the interests of Teachers and educational 
employees, since the Polish government was trying to gain 
greater control over school system, organized and 
coordinated teachers and other employees across all of 
Poland to protest/strike against the regime.   
Workers' 
National 
Movement 
RRN Domestic 
(Poland) 
Under Solidarity's umbrella, working-class group, anti-
Soviet nationalists, brought new and more members into 
the movement, as it was first truly nationalist group in 
Solidarity.  
Movement for 
Defense of 
Human and 
Civic Rights 
ROP Domestic 
(Poland) 
Under Solidarity's umbrella, contact with Poles abroad, 
published 3 movement periodicals and acted as grassroots 
organizers, and created "free discussion" clubs to get 
students and other people involved in the movement.  
Free Trade 
Unions 
WZZ Domestic 
(Poland) 
Created prior to Solidarity, then merged under Solidarity's 
umbrella, but leader of 1980 Lenin Shipyard strikes, 
produced papers and organized workers against the 
government. 
Civic 
Committee to 
Build a 
Monument in 
Honor of 
Victims of 
Katyn 
KPK Domestic 
(Poland) 
Under Solidarity's umbrella, nationalist group that added 
general assistance to the movement, such as providing 
protesters and spreading information. 
Society of 
Scientific 
Courses  
TKN Domestic 
(Poland) 
Under Solidarity's umbrella, hosted courses designed to 
"stimulate unfettered discussion on sensitive topics" in 
different locations across the country, to avoid repression, 
created competing political and cultural analyses.  
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Clubs in 
Service of 
Independence 
KSN Domestic 
(Poland) 
Under Solidarity's umbrella, nationalist group that added 
general assistance to the movement, such as providing 
protesters and spreading information. 
Committee 
Accord for 
National 
Independence 
PSN Domestic 
(Poland) 
Under Solidarity's umbrella, nationalist group that added 
general assistance to the movement, such as providing 
protesters and spreading information. 
Young Poland 
Movement 
RMP Domestic 
(Poland) 
Under Solidarity's umbrella, nationalist group that added 
general assistance to the movement, such as providing 
protesters and spreading information aimed at the Polish 
youth.  
Workers' 
Defense 
Committee 
KOR Domestic 
(Poland) 
Precursor to Solidarity, first major opposition civil-society 
group, sought reinstatements of fired employees, release of 
prisoners, coordinated the delivery of aid, advertised 
situation to West for funding, and led/organized protests. 
The Sign ZNK Domestic 
(Poland) 
Core Catholic Organization, published journals, primarily 
focusing on philosophical discussions, contributed 
members to newly formed NGOs, as they were already a 
developed and cohesive group, and eventually became part 
of Solidarity movement.  
Polish 
Independence 
Accord 
PPN Domestic 
(Poland) 
Under Solidarity's umbrella, acted to change foreign policy 
and improve freedom of speech, closely linked with 
Catholic NGOs, and used publications to spread beliefs, 
also shared members with other groups. 
Confederation 
for 
Independent 
Poland 
KPN Domestic 
(Poland) 
Under Solidarity's umbrella, nationalist group, right-wing 
radicals, organized and coordinated demonstrations, 
wanted credit to pull pressure away from KOR being 
repressed.  Also acted as intellectual leaders for many of 
the events. 
Universal 
Weekly 
TGP Domestic 
(Poland) 
One of the oldest opposition groups, also mainstream 
Catholic, voiced opinions through periodical, one of the 
core organizations of the movement, provided protesters, 
resources, and leadership to the movement, came under 
Solidarity. 
Club of 
Catholic 
Intelligentsia 
KIK Domestic 
(Poland) 
One of the oldest opposition groups, also mainstream 
Catholic, sponsored community lectures, language classes, 
excursions.  Acted to socialize opposition writers and 
artists.  Eventually came under Solidarity's umbrella.  
Link WEZ Domestic 
(Poland) 
One of the oldest opposition groups, also mainstream 
Catholic, voiced opinions through periodical, one of the 
core organizations of the movement, provided protesters, 
resources, and leadership to the movement, came under 
Solidarity. 
National 
Catholic Union 
ZNA Domestic 
(Poland) 
Under Solidarity's umbrella, mainstream Catholic, but also 
nationalist, one of the core Catholic organizations of the 
movement, provided protesters, resources, and leadership 
to the movement. 
Independent 
Association of 
Students 
NZS Domestic 
(Poland) 
Under Solidarity's umbrella, student group that added 
general assistance to the movement, such as providing 
protesters and spreading information. 
Movement of 
Polish 
Socialists' 
Accord 
RPS Domestic 
(Poland) 
Under Solidarity's umbrella, leftist group that added 
general assistance to the movement, such as providing 
resources and protesters, and spreading information.  
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Roman 
Catholic 
Church 
 
 
Holy See 
 
 
International 
(Vatican) 
 
 
Provided an international voice for the movement, as the 
Pope sent out political messages in favor of the opposition, 
and the Vatican permitted parish vans and buses to be used 
for transportation to protests and then to be used in the 
blockade of Warsaw.  Pope also called for greater 
assistance to the movement, especially food, medical, and 
financial donations.   
Charitable 
Commission of 
the Episcopate 
KCEP Domestic 
(Poland) 
Used networks of parishes spread out in all areas to 
efficiently disperse aid and resources, used to circumvent 
aid having to go through government, mostly provided 
medical equipment and clothing.  
Church World 
Services 
CWS International 
(America) 
Sent blankets, quilts, clothing, soap, and water cleansing 
pills, among a variety of other resources to the Polish 
opposition movement.  
Lutheran 
World Relief 
LWR International 
(America) 
Sent blankets, quilts, clothing, soap, and water cleansing 
pills, among a variety of other resources to the Polish 
opposition movement.  
American 
Federation of 
Labor and 
Congress of 
Industrial 
Organizations 
AFL-CIO International 
(America) 
Provided funds to Solidarity for office/publishing supplies 
and also sent funds to groups that they felt were 
underfunded by Solidarity.  Also worked to promote 
human rights in Poland and sent a large amount of 
technology that opposition could use, such as voice and 
cassette recorders, extra tapes, transistor, two-way, and 
short wave radios, mobile and base station antennas, and 
other types of communication equipment.  
Zeszyty 
Literackie 
ZL International 
(France) 
Small opposition literary journal that was published both 
for Polish immigrant and to be smuggled back into Poland, 
containing information about past and upcoming protests 
and actions.  
Free Trade 
Union Institute 
FTUI International 
(Europe) 
Financial middleman.  Funds were given to FTUI to 
forward to the proper Polish groups to help affected 
workers and keep certain organizations and offices 
operating.  
International 
Rescue 
Committee 
IRC International 
(America) 
Provided financial and material aid to political prisoners 
and their families throughout the movement. 
Smith-
Richardson 
Foundation 
SRF International 
(America) 
Private group that provided grants that were used to send 
parcels to jailed opposition members that were hidden in 
care packages.   
National 
Endowment 
for Democracy 
NED International 
(America) 
Funded underground/opposition publishers, PLDF, 
PHWC, cultural programs banned/limited by the 
government, and provided funding for the 
production/distribution of video resources across Poland, 
including independent theater shows, lectures from the 
Flying University, special political events, banned films, 
and opposition/instructional documentaries.  Also acted as 
intermediary for majority of funds provided by the US 
government that went to the opposition movement. 
ANEKS 
Publishing 
ANEKS International 
(England) 
Supported by NED funds, translated and published works 
for Western audiences and also published underground 
literature that was smuggled into Poland. 
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Aurora 
Foundation 
Aurora International 
(America) 
Responsible for administering the funds to the different 
organizations in the opposition movement provided by the 
NED, primarily to the Polish Legal Defense Fund. 
Uncensored 
Polish News 
Bulletin 
PNB International 
(England) 
Supported by NED funds, translated and published works 
for Western audiences and also published underground 
literature that was smuggled into Poland. 
Freedom 
House 
FH International 
(America) 
Responsible for administering the funds to the different 
organizations in the opposition movement provided by 
NED and Marshall Fund. 
CARE 
International 
CARE International 
(America) 
Provided 120,000 tons of aid worth $60 million to Polish 
opposition through public and private donations. 
Catholic Relief 
Services 
CRS International 
(America) 
Between 1981 and 1985 CRS was responsible for 266,000 
tons of aid worth $188 million, including food, medical, 
and other general resources, which were sent directly to 
aid the Polish opposition.  
 Polish 
American 
Congress 
Charitable 
Foundation, 
Inc. 
PACCF International 
(America) 
"Administers relief, rehabilitation, disaster assistance, 
welfare, medical equipment and supplies, and training on 
behalf of the Polish people. Since 1981, when Solidarity 
was formed, the PACCF has provided medical assistance 
in the form of equipment, supplies, medicines and medical 
books, food and agricultural supplies (such as seeds)." 
Radio Free 
Europe 
RFE International 
(Europe) 
Closely followed and reported the situation in Poland 
internationally, including interviews with opposition 
leaders.  Spread awareness of major events, people, and 
places of the struggle, including responses from the 
regime.   
Project Hope Hope International 
(America) 
Sent 100,000 tons of medical equipment worth $23 million 
to Polish opposition, mainly consisting of medical aid and 
equipment. 
Pomost Pomost International 
(America) 
Collected funds, published a Polish-American periodical, 
organized protests/demonstrations, lobbied congress, led 
Polish-American coalition in support of Solidarity 
movement, tried to attract attention of important 
international officials.  
Polish 
American 
Congress 
PAC International 
(America) 
Collected over 5 million dollars and 122 million dollars 
worth of relief goods between 1981-1988 that was sent to 
the Polish opposition, organized protests/demonstrations.  
August 1980 had 100,000 demonstrators in Chicago. 
Lobbied Congress. 
Polish Legal 
Defense Fund 
PLDF Both (Poland 
and America) 
Provided legal advice and support to pro-democracy 
protesters and strikers on trial.  All services provided Pro 
Bono, as funding came from grants and donations.  
Polish Helsinki 
Watch 
Committee 
PHWC International 
(Finland) 
Research/Published scholarly reports on situation in 
Poland, especially concerning human rights and murders 
by police and military forces.  
POLCUL POLCUL International 
(Australia) 
Provided awards of about $500 every year to Polish artists, 
writers, journalists, lawyers, actors, intellectuals, and 
scientists.  Designed to advance Polish culture 
internationally.   
Note: Based on Bernstein (1992), Ekiert (2001), Goodwyn (1991), Kidder (1981), Labedz (1984), Osa (2003), Schock (2004), and 
Francisco: European Protest and Coercion Data. 
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Appendix 2: Organizations involved in the non-violent movement in Serbia, 1999-
2000 
 
Organization Acronym Type 
(International 
or Domestic) 
Actions 
Otpor! Otpor! Domestic 
(Serbia) 
Independent civil-society institution, but acted as umbrella 
organization for all who wanted to get involved.  
Organized/led most major events/campaigns, such as the 
Birthday part, rallies, and the "He's Finished" Campaign 
Democratic 
Opposition of 
Serbia 
DOS Domestic 
(Serbia) 
Coalition of 18 opposition political parties, unified with 
Otpor!.  Planned and organized rallies, campaigns, and 
election monitoring.   
Open Society 
Institute 
OSI Domestic 
(Serbia) 
Started working with students at the University of 
Belgrade in 1998, teaching them about non-violent 
methods, global democracy, and human-rights campaigns.  
Open Society 
Institute 
OSI International 
(America) 
Sent funding and materials to start and operate OSI 
Belgrade, continued throughout movement, provided 
access to greater resources on non-violent action 
Drevni Telegraf Drevni Domestic 
(Serbia) 
Former Milosevic ally, began to print anti-Milosevic 
newsletters accusing Milosevic of establishing a "criminal 
autocracy" and printed materials for Otpor!, such as "Live 
the Resistance," the groups first manifesto.  
Boom 93 Boom 93 Domestic 
(Serbia) 
Illegal radio station broadcasting in Pozarevac, Serbia, 
developed into local Otpor! Cell, and used airways to 
spread protest information, and news for everyone, 
especially about the pro-regime strong arm actions of 
Marko Milosevic  
Red Star 
Belgrade Fans 
RSB Domestic 
(Serbia) 
Gave Belgrade protesters devices to monitor police radio 
transmissions.  
ANEM Media 
Network 
ANEM Domestic 
(Serbia) 
Organized pro-democracy rock tour in 25 Serbian cities, 
using music to tell the audience it was their responsibility 
to act for democracy. 
International 
Republic 
Institute 
IRI International 
(America) 
US NGO provided funds for movement, established 
contacts for Otpor!, and helped set up the movement with 
additional funding from different countries and NGOs. 
Albert Einstein 
Institute 
(None) International 
(America) 
Provided, through Helvey and Sharp, the philosophical and 
political foundation for the movements by speaking 
appearances and communicating with the leaders of the 
movement.  
Cable News 
Network 
CNN International 
(America) 
Closely covered the movement and the regime's response 
from approximately 1998 to Milosevic's overthrow, 
provided movement with greater domestic and 
international attention. 
Human Rights 
Watch 
HRW International 
(America) 
Reported on the multiple human-rights violations by the 
regime against the organizations, leaders, and non-
participants, helped report internationally and attract 
attention to the violations of human rights in the country.  
Center for Free 
Elections and 
Democracy 
CESID Domestic 
(Serbia) 
Operated training program for thousands of election 
monitors to eliminate/detect fraud at polls.   
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OK98 
 
 
 
OK98 
 
 
 
International 
(Slovakia) 
 
 
 
Leader of non-partisan Exit 2000 and Vreme Je 
campaigns, to get everybody out to vote.  Helped to get 
people to understand the importance of their vote, actually 
provided transportation and other means so that people 
could go vote. 
Rock Volieb (None) Domestic 
(Serbia) 
Leader of non-partisan Exit 2000 and Vreme Je 
campaigns, to get everybody out to vote.  Helped to get 
people to understand the importance of their vote, actually 
provided transportation and other means so that people 
could go vote. 
German 
Marshall Fund 
of the US 
(None) International 
(America) 
Provided a large amount of funds to the movement, 
especially for the Exit 2000 campaign.   
National 
Endowment for 
Democracy 
NED International 
(America) 
One of three American NGO's responsible for donating 
"several million dollars" that went to Otpor!. 
Amnesty 
International 
AI International 
(America) 
Helped Serbian conscientious objectors flee conscription 
from JNA and provided legal services to refugees 
attempting to escape Serbia, such as Bojan Aleksov. 
Institute for 
War and Peace 
Reporting 
IWPR International 
(America) and 
Domestic 
(Serbia) 
Reported during and after about the results of the protest 
events, specifically the number of arrests that occurred 
after each event led by Otpor!  
Freedom House FH International 
(America) 
Provided funding, printed materials, and monitored all 
protests and events and reported back to American  
United States 
Institute of 
Peace 
USIP International 
(America) 
Monitored institutional structures of both the opposition 
and the regime, and kept the opposition informed 
regarding institutional considerations if/when they would 
take power from Milosevic. 
Exit 2000 Exit 2000 Domestic 
(Serbia) 
Collective of civil society groups, focused on those 
disconnected from politics, made/spread leaflets, posters, 
T-shits, hats across the country, trying to persuade more 
people to the movement. 
Humanitarian 
Law Foundation 
HLF Domestic 
(Serbia) 
Provided legal advice to thousands of protests, especially 
Otpor! Activists after their offices were raided by the 
military/police. 
Note: Based on Collin (2009), Lazic (1999), Ramet (2005), and Schock (2004).                
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Appendix 3: Major Non-violent Action Campaigns and Events in Poland, 1980-1989 
Action Date  Location(s)  
Method of 
Non-violent 
Action 
Leader(s)/ 
Organizer(s) 
Third-Party 
Participation 
Number of 
Participants 
Strikes: after 
meat prices are 
raised, then 
spread to 
wages and 
right to strike. 
July 1980 - 
August 
1980 
Initially 
Northern 
Poland, then 
Gdansk, 
Lublin, 
Warsaw, and 
then 
nationwide 
Protest and 
Persuasion, 
noncooperation 
Initially no clear 
leadership, 
August 16, 1980 
Inter-factory 
Strike 
Committee 
formed.  Leads 
strikes. 
Minimal at 
beginning, 
increased 
gradually as 
strikes 
continued. 
Protests range 
between 1,000 
and 200,000 
Participants  
1-hour 
warning strike 
for pay raises 
October 3, 
1980 Nationwide 
Protest and 
Persuasion, 
noncooperation 
Solidarity Moderate, but still active.   
300,000 
nationwide 
Free Saturday 
Strike 
January 24, 
1981 Nationwide 
Protest and 
Persuasion, 
noncooperation 
Solidarity 
Moderate 
participation, 
provided 
resources to 
spread action 
Approximately 
7,000,000 
workers 
General Anti-
Government 
Strikes 
January 28, 
1981 - 
February 6, 
1981 
Nationwide 
Protest and 
Persuasion, 
noncooperation 
Solidarity 
Moderate 
participation, 
provided 
resources to 
protesters 
Estimated 
between 1,000 
and 250,000 
participants per 
protest 
Protests and 
City Blockade 
August 3, 
1981    - 
August 6, 
1981 
Warsaw 
Nonviolent 
intervention: 
Disruptive 
Solidarity 
Heavy 
participation, 
provided 
resources and 
support 
Approximately 
between 3,000 
and 100,000 
participants 
Underground 
rallies and 
protests 
May 1, 
1982 - May 
3, 1982 
Primarily 
Warsaw and 
Gdansk, but 
also in some 
other cities 
Protest and 
persuasion 
Solidarity 
(underground) 
Increased 
involvement, 
especially from 
Catholic Civil 
Society 
Institutions 
Estimated 
between 3,000 
and 60,000 per 
event 
Anti-
Government 
demonstrations 
on Gdansk 
Agreement 
anniversary 
August 31, 
1982 Nationwide 
Protest and 
persuasion 
Solidarity 
(underground) 
Moderate 
involvement, 
support for 
Solidarity while 
underground 
30,000 per city 
Lenin 
Shipyard 
Strikes 
(including 
hunger strikes) 
October, 
1982 Gdansk 
Nonviolent 
intervention: 
Disruptive 
Solidarity 
(underground) 
Minimal 
participation. 
Ranges between 
1,000 and 
30,000 strikers  
Elections 
Protests 
June 20, 
1984 Warsaw 
Protest and 
persuasion 
Solidarity 
(underground) 
Heavy 
involvement, 
provided 
transportation, 
resources, and 
information  
Varied reports 
put estimates 
between 100 
and 1,000 
Sejm Election 
Boycotts 
October 18, 
1985 Warsaw 
Nonviolent 
intervention: 
Disruptive 
Solidarity 
(underground) 
Heavy 
participation, 
primarily by 
human rights 
orgs and the 
Catholic Church 
Approximately 
5,000 
participants 
First wave of 
nationwide 
strikes 
April, 1988           
-                    
May, 1988 
Started in 
Gdansk 
Shipyard, 
spread 
nationwide 
Protest and 
persuasion Solidarity 
Heavy 
participation, 
primarily by 
human rights 
orgs and the 
Catholic Church 
Between 3,000 
and 16,000 
participants per 
strike 
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Second wave 
of nationwide 
strikes 
August, 
1988 
Started in 
Warsaw, 
rapidly spread 
nationwide 
Protest and 
Persuasion, 
Noncooperation, 
and Nonviolent 
intervention: 
Disruptive 
Solidarity and 
the Catholic 
Church 
Heavy 
participation by 
civil society 
groups 
1,000 - 10,000 
participants per 
event 
March through 
city centre         
(Great March) 
February, 
1989 Szczecin 
Protest and 
Persuasion 
Lech Walesa, 
Solidarity 
non-active 
participants 40,000 
Note: Based on Bernstein (1992), Ekiert (2001), Goodwyn (1991), Kidder (1981), Labedz (1984), Osa (2003), Schock (2004), and 
Francisco: European Protest and Coercion Data. 
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Appendix 4: Major Non-violent Action Campaigns and Events in Serbia, 1999-2000 
Action Date Location(s) 
Method of 
Non-violent 
Action 
Leader(s)/  
Organizer(s) 
Third-Party 
Participation 
Number of 
Participants 
Anti-
government 
protests 
June, 1999 Belgrade Protest and persuasion Otpor! Minimal 1,000 
"Birthday 
Party" for 
Milosevic 
August, 1999 Nis Protest and persuasion Otpor! Minimal 2,000 
Serbian 
economy 
protests 
September, 
1999 20 cities 
Protest and 
persuasion 
Fragmented 
Leadership Moderate 
10,000 - 
15,000 per city 
Hospital march 
to see wounded 
protesters 
October, 1999 Belgrade Protest and persuasion 
Democratic 
Party, led by 
Zoran Djindjic 
Minimal 7,000 
Rock Concert 
Rally 
November, 
1999 Belgrade 
Protest and 
persuasion Otpor! 
High level of 
involvement in 
concert/rally, 
provided 
resources and 
activists 
2,500 
Orthodox New 
Year rally 
January 13, 
2000 Belgrade 
Protest and 
persuasion 
Opposition 
politicians and 
Otpor! 
Minimal 1,000 + 
Anti-Milosevic 
Regime 
protests,  
April, 2000 Belgrade 
Protest and 
Persuasion, 
Nonviolent 
Intervention: 
Disruptive and 
Creative  
Political 
Opponents and 
Otpor! 
High level of 
involvement, 
provided 
resources, 
spread 
information, 
transported 
activists. 
100,000 
Protests 
demonstrations May, 2000 Nationwide 
Protest and 
persuasion 
Democratic 
Opposition of 
Serbia (DOS) 
and Otpor! 
High level of 
involvement, 
provided 
resources, 
spread 
information, 
transported 
activists. 
Average of 
20,000 per day 
over multiple 
days 
Protest of 
University 
Closing 
May 27, 2000 Belgrade Protest and persuasion DOS, Otpor! Minimal 1,000 + 
This is the face 
of Serbia 
Campaign 
July 17, 2000 Belgrade Protest and persuasion Otpor! 
Moderate: Non-
active 
participants. 
1,000 + 
"He's finished" 
campaign. August, 2000 Belgrade 
Noncooperation, 
Protest and 
persuasion 
DOS, Otpor! 
Heavy 
involvement, 
provided 
strategy, 
material, and 
financial 
resources  
Unknown (not 
a typical 
protest rally, 
but 
underground 
action and 
movement) 
Protest for 
Milosevic's 
resignation in 
response to 
election 
outcome 
Sept. 27, 2000 Belgrade and other cities 
Noncooperation, 
Protest and 
persuasion 
DOS, Otpor! 
Extremely 
involved, 
mobilized 
people, poll 
monitors, 
transportations, 
money, 
leadership, etc. 
100,000 + 
115 
General strike, 
sit-ins, Coal 
miner's strike 
October 2, 
2000 
Kolubara 
Mines, then 
nationwide 
Nonviolent 
Intervention: 
Disruptive and 
Creative; Protest 
and persuasion, 
and 
noncooperation 
Coal Miners, 
DOS, and 
Otpor! 
10,000 + 
General strike, 
sit-ins, 
Worker's strike 
October 3, 
2000 Nationwide 
Nonviolent 
Intervention: 
Disruptive and 
Creative; Protest 
and persuasion, 
and 
noncooperation 
Coal Miners, 
DOS, and 
Otpor! 
1,000 + per 
city 
General strike, 
sit-ins, 
complete 
country 
shutdown 
October 4, 
2000 Nationwide 
Nonviolent 
Intervention: 
Disruptive and 
Creative; Protest 
and persuasion, 
and 
noncooperation 
Workers, DOS, 
and Otpor! 
1,000 + per 
city 
General strike, 
sit-ins, 
complete 
country 
shutdown, 
including 
official police 
forces. 
October 5, 
2000 
Nationwide, 
but 
concentrated in 
Belgrade 
Nonviolent 
Intervention: 
Disruptive and 
Creative; Protest 
and persuasion, 
and 
noncooperation 
Workers, DOS, 
Police/Military 
Forces, and 
Otpor! 
Maximum 
involvement, 
mobilized 
hundreds of 
thousands, 
many NGO's 
involved, 
provided 
financial 
resources, 
transportation 
of workers and 
protesters into 
Belgrade, 
helped in 
takeover of 
Parliament and 
TV/Radio 
station, human 
rights 
organizations, 
unions, and a 
variety of other 
civil society 
institutions.     
100,000 - 
500,000 in 
Belgrade, 
thousands per 
other cities 
Note: Based on Collin (2009), Lazic (1999), Ramet (2005), and Schock (2004).                
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Appendix 5:  Keck and Sikkink’s Boomerang Pattern 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Keck, Margaret E. "Social Equity and Environmental Politics in Brazil: Lessons from the Rubber 
Tappers of Acre," Comparative Politics 27 (July 1995): pp. 409-24. 
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Appendix 6: Organization-to-organization ties in Poland, 1980-1981 
 
 
Source: Osa, Maryjane. Solidarity and Contention: Networks of Polish Opposition. Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press, 2003.  
 
 
